From Kim Jong Un’s perspective, in order
for reform to succeed, first, the speed and degree of opening up the country
must be right. It is far too dangerous to execute reform at too fast a pace.
However, it appears very possible that the young leader, who seems to lack
prudence, might in fact push forward with reform policies at a faster pace than
necessary, especially if he sees a degree of success from implementation and
this boosts his confidence.
Unlike China, North Korea is a small
country with a small population. This means success can spread quickly, but it
also makes the country very vulnerable to failure, lacking any buffer to absorb
such missteps. Also, with South Korea positioned as a strong alternative force
on the other side of the border, radical reform that brings about unwanted side
effects and stirs up discontent among the public will quickly cause things to
get out of hand.
Second, Pyongyang needs to enhance cooperation
with China. Currently, its relationship with Beijing is not what it once was. A
good example that well portrays this is the fact that Party-run Rodong Sinmun
published a congratulatory message from China’s President Xi Jinping in time
for the North’s foundation day on the paper’s third page, while one from
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was issued on the front page. Nothing in this
world is forever absolute, as seen in the gradual shift of relations between
the North and China. From China’s point of view, as it solidifies its position
as a G2 nation, Pyongyang’s aggressive and unpredictability are no longer
welcome qualities.
In addition, Beijing cannot help but be
conscious of its conventional role of “protecting” Pyongyang. If the Kim Jong
Un regime shows firm will for reform and moves towards improving relations with
Seoul, not only will it see inter-Korean ties improve, it can also receive
strong support from China. Furthermore, if the North firmly commits to halting
its nuclear weapons development and tests, there is the possibility that (other
countries) will overlook its existing nuclear program.
Third, it must uphold its tight
surveillance on the ruling elite and military but relax monitoring of its
people and foreigners. The North should also gradually allow freedom of
movement and communication and without doubt rid the country of inhumane
practices such as operating political prison camps and holding public
executions.
Fourth, it needs to improve ties with Seoul
to a certain extent. Until the North’s reforms attain a certain level of
maturity, an overly close relationship with the South could become a political
burden. Therefore, the North needs to keep a healthy distance from Seoul but
receive an appropriate amount of aid and slowly expand exchanges.
Fifth, Pyongyang needs to secure
reparations from Japan by improving ties with Tokyo. There have been movements
to make progress in relations with Russia and Japan in the face of lackluster
performance on the front of South Korea and the U.S. If the North can normalize
relations with Tokyo, one of the best rewards of that would be receiving
roughly 10 billion to 20 billion USD in reparations for World War II. For a country that struggles with a chronic shortage
in foreign currency, this money could make up for a significant part of its
“seed money” for reform in the initial stages.
All of the above may look intangible if the
Kim Jong Un regime fails to give up its nuclear weapons, but that is not
necessarily true. In regards to the North’s nuclear program, the international
community has come to the conclusion over the past two decades that it will be
virtually impossible to resolve the problem through negotiations or sanctions.
However, if Pyongyang turns toward reform, China, South Korea, and the U.S. may
on the surface uphold their rhetoric against its nuclear weapons program but
will have no choice but to acknowledge its presence and support the country’s
reform measures.
It is likely those who believe nothing can
be done to reverse the North’s nuclear weapons program will gain the upper hand, asserting that the international community must support the communist regime in its
reform efforts under the condition that Pyongyang freezes its program and does not produce any new nuclear weapons.
