Role of the U.S. in German Unification

The US played a vital role in making German
reunification take place. Reagan’s foreign policy, nicknamed “peace through
strength,” was a background factor behind Gorbachev’s appointment as general
secretary and the subsequent domestic reforms that he began. To be more
specific, the US openly declared its support for German unity since May  
1989, which gave West German Chancellor Kohl
the support to focus on reunification in face of domestic and foreign opposition.
The US also facilitated the various negotiations through which the USSR,
France, and England finally approved reunification.

The US energetically supported German
reunification for pragmatic reasons. The US came to view Germany as a partner
in leadership together with whom they could lead the world in the 21st century, due to West Germany’s unwavering pro-west, pro-US stance, as well as Germany’s
willingness to accommodate American demands concerning on German reunification.

American Influence on Kohl’s Reunification
Efforts

The West German constitution stipulated the
country to work towards achieving reunification. Nonetheless, the ongoing Cold
War meant that mentioning reunification became politically taboo. As long as
the war continued, reunification appeared unrealistic. Moreover, reunification
was associated with German nationalism, which, to many people, had previously
reached its full culmination in Nazism.

However, the national attitude regarding
reunification began to change in 1989 with the ascendancy of democratic
movements in Poland, Hungary, and other East European countries. At this time, Kohl
declared that the thaw in East Europe would provide an opportunity to achieve
German reunification. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, his efforts
became even more concerted, with the publication of his ten point plan “Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe.” As important as was the political
shifts in Eastern Europe that allowed Kohl to make such statements, Bush’s
express support for Kohl’s efforts just as important.

Bush already voiced his support for German
unity in a May 1989 Washington Times interview. At a Montana news conference
held on September 18th, he opined that German unity would not be a
destabilizing cause in Europe. He reiterated his support on October 24th by
stating that “I don’t share the concern that some European countries have about
a reunified Germany.” On November 29th, one day after Kohl had presented his
ten-point plan, the US Secretary of State Baker declared American support for
the plan. Thus, Bush’s support empowered Kohl to focus on reunification in the
face of domestic and foreign opposition.

Baker’s expression of support for the plan,
which quickly followed its presentation, helped Kohl to face off against the
plan’s detractors, thereby accelerating the reunification process.

Baker also met with the East German Prime
Minister Hans Modrow in December 1989. He agreed to provide substantial
financial support, but did not carry through with it, in order to prevent any
appearance of exerting any influence in the upcoming East German general
election.

Bush also wrote a famous letter to Kohl in
February 1990 as the latter was preparing for a conference with Gorbachev. In
the letter, Bush assured Kohl that the four major powers would exercise their
powers in accordance with the goal of helping Germany become a peaceful and
democratic country. Moreover, the US would not allow the USSR to use its major
power status to dictate the process and pace of German reunification. This
letter allowed Kohl to negotiate from a strong position.

American Influence in Preventing British
and French Obstructions

The US also played a big role in preventing
Britain and France from interfering in the process of German reunification. As
mentioned, Bush made a statement on October 24, voicing his opinion that he did
not share the concerns of other European states over German reunification.
Essentially, he meant that he would not take lightly any meddling from these two
countries.

Thatcher and Bush met at a summit on
November 17th. When she expressed concerns that the reunification process was proceeding
far too quickly than she had expected, Bush immediately disagreed. As
aforementioned, the swift American approval for the Ten-Point Plan was another
warning to the two countries to not present any obstructions.

Bush also met with the French president
Mitterrand on April 20, 1990, and received the latter’s promise to approve
German reunification. This promise was crucial in the passing of a resolution
regarding German unity held at a European Council summit held in Dublin nine
days after the two leaders’ meeting.

America’s Role in Attaining Soviet Cooperation

The US and West Germany worked in tandem to
overcome Soviet disapproval of German unity. When Eastern European democratic
movements first took off, the US refrained from voicing its support for German
unity in order to avoid irritating the USSR. Yet, as the democratic movements
advanced, the US pronounced its support for self-determination of both Germanies
.

Naturally, the USSR wanted to have a
greater say in the reunification process, and also to decelerate it. The USSR’s
proposal of using the Two Plus Four Talks as a major forum for discussing
reunification would achieve this goal by cutting out participation from
extraneous parties. At the same time, the USSR, along with the UK, France, and
West Germany, refused to give much weight to international associations such as
the CSCE and Peace Conference, whose influence could potentially diminish that
of the USSR.  

The US was aware that Gorbachev faced
political pressure from the hardliners in the Party, and therefore tried to
give him a stronger position to work with. On December 19, 1989, Soviet foreign
minister Shevardnadze visited the NATO headquarters in an effort to lessen the
tension with the USSR. The US also used its influence to pass an EC resolution
providing the USSR with financial support at the session held in June 1990 at
Dublin.

The US especially went to great efforts to
support Gorbachev in July 1990, at which time the USSR held its 28th Congress
and Gorbachev was running again for Chief Secretary. NATO, through the US’s backing, issued the “Declaration of a Transformed NATO” at the July 1990 London
Summit. 
At the Houston Summit of the
G-7, the US lobbied for greater financial support for the USSR. These
developments at NATO and G-7 were extensively reported to the USSR before the
Congress was held, and subsequently helped Gorbachev stay in power by a great
margin.

The last issue which required Soviet
approval was the issue of Germany’s NATO membership. To show that the US and
West Germany were on the same page, Bush told Gorbachev in a February 28 phone
conversation that he and Kohl agreed that a unified Germany would stay in NATO.
However, Gorbachev, in a March 7 interview with a German TV station, told them
that this would not be allowed.

But when Gorbachev visited Washington in
May, both countries had come to an agreement in principle. Gorbachev’s initial
position was that a unified Germany must belong to both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, or become neutral. However, Bush convinced Gorbachev otherwise by
stressing that German membership in NATO would act as an effective restraint
against any unilateral actions from a reunified Germany. Bush also raised the CSCE
provision which stipulated the self-determination of any state to enter into
any alliances it wishes. Gorbachev argued that the four major states should reserve
for a certain period Germany’s power of entering into alliances. He had to
argue for this because it was the position of Soviet hardliners.

To overcome this last hurdle, the other
three major states chose UK’s proposal of making a shocking statement. On June
22, Baker announced during a session of the Talks that the US, UK, and France were
going to unconditionally surrender their authorities as a major power and that
the USSR would follow their example. However, Shevardnadze cited that domestic
circumstances prevented them from giving full consideration to this plan, and
hence refused to change his stance. Nonetheless, Bush had received from Gorbachev
an informal promise before the June summit to do the same, and Gorbachev
formally gave effect to it in July following a Party plenary session. In
exchange, West Germany promised that NATO’s military positions in West Germany would
not expand eastwards until Soviet military withdrawal from East Germany was
complete. All of these Soviet agreements would not have been given without
active US participation in the negotiations.

The US energetically supported German
reunification for the following reasons. Firstly, the US did not have a bias
against Germany as other European states did. Secondly, a reunified Germany
would increase US influence in the region, especially as Eastern Europe and the
USSR were undergoing political changes. Thirdly, only a reunified Germany would
continue participating in NATO as opposed to becoming fully neutral. Fourthly,
the US saw in Germany a partner in world leadership. There were other reasons
as well.

Firstly, self-determination was held to be
one of the fundamental principles of statehood in American history. Secondly, by
ensuring that the reunification process included the EC and NATO, the new
Germany would be embedded with the values of liberal democracy. Thirdly, the US
had a solid trust relationship with West Germany, so that it had no
apprehensions over the negotiations between the USSR and West Germany.
Fourthly, the US recognized West Germany’s influence over Europe. The US’s
vigorous promotion of German reunification was a culmination of the sustained
good relations that began during Adenauer’s term.

Luck also played a part in reunification.
If the 1990 Gulf War had begun two months earlier, then the US could not have
dedicated its full effort in marshaling support for German unity through the
respective summits held between the US-USSR, NATO, and G-7. In particular, the
US depended upon Soviet cooperation in the Gulf problem, so that pressuring
Soviet approval for German unity would have been even more difficult. In
addition, the dissolution of USSR 15 states and the resignation of Gorbachev
took place a year after German reunification took place. If reunification had
not been finished by that time, then attaining the approval of the 15 states
would have cost much more time and money. These points show that German
reunification can be seen as a gift from heaven.

*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.