Do the May 24th Sanctions on North Korea Need to Be Dropped?

As though they had been waiting for it, the
cries to drop the May 24th sanctions tangibly grew louder
as soon as the three high level officials from North Korea went back. Are we
finally in “reconciliation mode”? If these sanctions were dropped, could North
and South Korea have a good sibling-like relationship?

All strong and oppressive actions must
disappear. The May 24th measures, which included banning all manner of trade
between the North and the South, are no exception. The only problem is when and
how. A detailed method for solving this must be supported by domestic and
international environmental “conditions” as well as a contemporary “context”.
But this in turn begs the question of whether we will dully wait for both
conditions and context or if we will proceed with building and composing the
components for them. I would assert that if we had to completely ignore both
conditions and context, and that the May 24th measures were immediately
dropped, it would be akin to rejecting any historical trace of sincerity and
honesty. 

The causative actions that induce any kind
of result do not just disappear. Historically, no crime has been forgiven
without pure sacrifice. Christianity cut history into two halves [BC and AD] with Jesus’s blood on the cross. The murder of Ms. Park Wang Ja while she was
vacationing on Geumgang Mountain and the  Yeonpyeong Island attack are
critical national, organized crimes that cannot just be erased. If the
government would just sit idly by and dully wait for conditions and context, it
is only right that they be reprimanded. In order to develop conditions and
context sub-policies must be developed and executed; it is the government’s
responsibility to put forth such an effort. The sanctions should not just be
dropped just because of the stirrings of national sympathy; they should be
dropped based on certain conditions and context. There is neither reason nor
need for the ordinary citizen to thoroughly know government policies on this
matter. The details are for those that are appointed in office and responsible
for policy-making. But there are few among North Korean specialists and North
Korean-friendly politicians that believe that the problem of conditions and
context could be solved simply by “apologies from the North and promises to
never do these things again”. 

Thus far, there has never been a case in
all of international politics where economic sanctions have succeeded. All
economic sanctions are predestined to fail. Nevertheless, they are implemented
with a political goal in mind. A political message is communicated through
economic expression, and it is in this unilateral severance that the truth of
economic sanctions is found. If this is the case, can the sanctions just be
dropped whenever and however we wish? It is like parents taking extreme
measures with a troublesome child: “If you don’t listen, we won’t give you
food.” But just like how parents would not starve their child to death and
would send him or her to a relative’s house instead, we are coaxing and
persuading, going through a series of exhaustive, nurturing efforts.

But we only know the cause behind the May
24th measures and not what the government is doing or has done to build the
conditions and context to drop them. Politicians and North Korean specialists
alike must ask the government about this before asserting that they should be
dropped. They need to ask what the government is doing or has done and what the
plans are for the future. If the government says they have done nothing, they
must sternly berate them. Because why would the government not have already
tried to figure out what the conditions and context would be in the event that
the sanctions would be dropped? It is as though they are standing under a
persimmon tree with ripe persimmons ready to drop and are foolishly staring at
the sky instead. And heartfelt proposals and advice must be given. This is the
intellectual responsibility of the North Korean specialists. Anyone can assert
that sanctions must be dropped. Even those ignorant of “conditions and context”
can blindly call for it. The thoughtless popular media has created an
atmosphere where it is easy to get carried away, but specialists and
politicians must be like the “light in a refrigerator”: shining on, as the one
bright light in the darkness, is their obligation and duty.

Those politicians and specialists that have
a great influence on policy-makers must suggest cold-hearted alternatives, in
accordance with the proper conditions and context, rather than viewing the
situation with rose-colored glasses. That is true advice. The advice can differ
in accordance with different views on the matter, but if there is a communal
understanding about the initial conditions and context, that difference will be
minimal and will not matter in the end.

It bears repeating that whether the
discussion starts because of dropping the May 24th measures or not, the
conditions and context for dropping the sanctions must be arranged in
accordance to South Korea’s position and direction toward the future, strategy,
and a detailed plan of action. The Unification Preparatory Committee has
the right to grab hold of the center of this controversy and assume the role of
mediator. Isn’t that what the committee was composed for? We should not be so
foolish as to throw the baby out with the bath water, but neither should we
neglect the infant until he or she can bathe for his or herself. I hope that
the measures against North Korea are dropped “independently” of recent events;
that they are not just dropped because three influential North Korean officials
suddenly visited South Korea out of the blue. I am filled with hope that a
suitable way to drop the sanctions is found.