Overall, the Two Plus Four Talks were
pivotal to German reunification. It was a formality put in place in order to
receive approval from the 4 nations, the United States, United Kingdom, France,
and Soviet Union, which were victorious in World War II. According to the 1952
General Treaty of Germany, the consent of all four of these nations was needed
to for reunification. From May 5th,1990, the countries concerned, East and West
Germany, the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union etc. held four
rounds of conferences. The finalization of the Treaty on the Final Settle with
Respect to Germany completed the outside proceedings on German reunification.
Additionally, the conference addressed several
points crucial to the German reunification process: [1] acknowledgement of the
Oder-Neisse border [2] abandonment of chemical, biological, radiological [CBR]
weapons manufacturing and a maximum limit of 370,000 military personnel [3]
withdrawal of Soviet soldiers stationed in East Germany [4] the place of
Unified Germany in NATO. However, the fact that the Two Plus Four Talks was
less of a ‘reunification catalyst,’ and, more of an ‘aftermath facilitator’ resembles
the role of the Six-Party Talks in the Korean situation.
Background of the Two Plus Four Talks
After Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s announcement of the 10-Point Plan for German
Unity on November 28th, 1989, dialogue began in earnest in West Germany and
abroad. The USSR became worried by this situation, and accordingly proposed a
conference between the four countries to be held on December 11th, 1989. On the
surface, these discourses, which were based on East Germany’s Community
Treaties, were the beginnings of reunification talks between East and West
Germany. However, the USSR’s true purpose in directly intervening in the
reunification process was to pose delays and obstructions.
However, Chancellor Kohl argued that it was
unacceptable for the four nations to make progress in reunification talks while
East Germany was excluded. The United States was opposed to such talks as well.
In particular, these talks could provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union
to: [1] restore its waning power [2] delay German reunification, in order to [3]
emphasize denuclearization of Central Europe, and [4] argue that the presence
of Soviet soldiers in Germany were necessary to counteract the presence of US
soldiers in Germany.
Yet, the US could not reject these talks
outright for the following reasons: [1] If the United States gave the
impression of disparaging the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s reformation programme could
have been threatened, [2] if a multilateral agreement could not be reached,
West Germany and Soviet Union would take it upon themselves to discuss the
German reunification issue, during which the Soviet Union would neutralize the
reunification or negotiate for Germany’s exclusion from NATO, [3] in such a
bilateral discussion, NATO would be considered a hindrance to the process, [4]
there was a good chance that France and Britain would also attend the talks in
order to boost their respective influences in German reunification, [5] for Gorbachev
to invite the major powers of the Second World War to a German Peace Conference
and manage the conference would be a challenging task, [6] the contemporary
geopolitical situation, in which the USSR was in a tight corner, would
facilitate the passing of motions to which the USSR was opposed. Moreover, West
Germany also felt that a pledge of security assurance for Europe, in case of
future Soviet aggression, was necessary after German reunification. These
reasons necessitated an American response to the Soviet proposal.
Peace Conference or CSCE
However, there were several problems to the
various proposals for talks such as the Peace Conference or the CSCE meetings. The
format of the Peace Conference did not give Germany any say in deciding its own
future, but such power was given to some thirty countries, like Uruguay, which
had no major role in the Second World War. Such an arrangement potentially
allowed the participants to seek their own profits by agreeing to ask Germany
for war reparations. The format of the CSCE had the advantage of respecting
Soviet input, but reaching a consensus from the 35 participant countries would
obviously be difficult. Moreover, the format of the CSCE gave countries such as
the Vatican or Lichtenstein the veto over German reunification.
In the face of the Soviet proposal and the
inadequacy of the existing international forums, the solution was found in the
Two Plus Four Talks. The Talks would [1] give the USSR an international forum to
vent its frustrations, [2] be the best option of stopping the Soviet-proposed
four powers’ talks from taking place, [3] allow greater efficiency in
negotiations due to its small scale, [4] be advantageous for German
reunification because it would allow the two Germanys, instead of the four
major powers, to lead the negotiations, and [5] prevent any antagonistic action
from England and France, such as proposing a Peace Conference. For these
reasons, Secretary Baker, with the support of President Bush, pushed on with
the Talks despite the opposition from the National State Council.
The Main Strategy of the US
The US decided that the 2+4 Talks would not
be a place for negotiations, but only a conference. Specifically, the US
intended for the USSR to receive the impression that progress was being made,
whereas, in actuality, no binding decisions would be made at the talks. The
Talks would be operated under these seven principles:
[1] The CSCE’s stipulation on self-determination
must be strictly followed. This meant that any talks on the future of Germany
could not take place in West and East Germanys’ absence.
[2] In order to prevent the four major
powers from derailing the reunification process, the notion that the four
powers held any authority to influence Germany’s future had to be divested of
its power.
[3] The format of the Talks would allow the
two Germanys to lead the negotiations (2+4). A format in which the six
countries all had equal stature (six-party talks), or one in which the four
major powers preceded the Germanys (4+2) would not be allowed.
[4] Once the German reunification process
was indeed under way, resolutions on the Germanys’ foreign relation issues
should be reached through bilateral negotiations between the two Germanys. In
order to achieve such a result, the reunification process should be given as
much support as possible, while delaying future 2+4 talks as much as possible.
[5] In order to prevent giving the
impression that the West interfered in East German elections, the first 2+4
Talks is to be held after the elections.
[6]The CSCE summit should be delayed until
German reunification had taken place, so that the reunification is ratified by
the summit ex post facto.
[7] The US Secretary of State Baker would
personally visit Gorbachev in his trip to the USSR in February 1990, in order
to explain the 2+4 Talks to Gorbachev and ask for his cooperation.
The Schedule of the Talks and Results
There were particular reasons for holding the Talks in certain places. The
first of the Talks were held in the West German capital of Bonn. The reason
that the first and second talks were held respectively in West and East Germany
was to demonstrate that they were the foremost participants of the Talks. The
first talk was held in May 5th, after the East German elections had taken
place, in order to avoid accusations that the Talks were intended to interfere
in the elections. It was also to accommodate France and USSR that the third and
fourth talks were held respectively in Paris and Moscow. Nonetheless, under the
format of the Two Plus Four Talks, the four countries participated only to
ratify the agreements that had been reached through the bilateral negotiations
between the two Germanys. The four countries did not contribute significantly
to the resolution of major issues.
The first talks began on May 5th, 1990, in
Bonn. Secretary Baker stated that the Germany issue should be resolved by the
German people; in contrast, the Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze argued
against a unified Germany having any role in NATO, and also that the internal
and external developments in German reunification need not progress at the same
time. Participants in this talk agreed on future talks, the participation of
Poland in the Paris talks to be held in July, the recognition of German
self-determination, and the recognition of Oder-Neisse Border line. However, no
agreement was reached on unified Germany’s participation in NATO.
The second talks began on June 22nd in East Berlin. The main consensus reached
at this talk was that a draft of the Two Plus Four Treaty would be completed
before the CSCE summit which would be held in November 7th. The USSR proposed
that the German military be limited to three hundred to three hundred five
thousand troops, the four major powers’ Germany-related authorities and
responsibilities be preserved until five years had passed after German
reunification, and the basic participation in pre-existing international pacts.
In response, the US opposed these proposals on the basis of complete
self-determination on the part of Germany.
[1] The Paris talks, which began on July
17, saw the resolution of numerous major issues.
[2] Unified Germany to have complete
self-determination
[3] The abolition of any powers or
responsibilities that the four major powers had relating to Germany
[4] Unified Germany to have power to join
any international pacts as it desired
[5] The recognition of Oder-Neisse Border
Line
[6] German military to be limited to
370,000 personnel
[7] German military to not use,
manufacture, possess biological, chemical, radiological weapons
[8] Soviet troops to withdraw completely
from Germany in 3-4 years
[9] NATO would not undertake eastward
expansion until Soviet withdrawal was complete
[10] American, English, and French troops
to stay in Berlin until complete Soviet military withdrawal
[11] The conclusion of succession
agreements between Germany and Soviet Union
[12] The participants agreed to finalize
the Two Plus Four Talks on September 12.
On September 12th, the four-month long
conference finally came to an end with the signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty,
or the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, on September 12th.
The Treaty, in part, included an agreement to give 13 million marks to the USSR
to cover the withdrawal of its troops.
However, the Two Plus Four Treaty was not
put into effect until October 3rd, 1990, because the of the signatories’ slow
ratification process. Consequently, each foreign minister from the four major
powers convened in New York on October 1st, 1990, and signed an agreement to
suspend their powers related to Germany. Their respective powers remained
suspended until the Treaty was finally ratified two days later.
The Two Plus Four Talks served to formulate the bilateral agreements that were
reached. However, the negotiation process was not always smooth. The USSR
maintained their hardliner stance, and when the West tried to coerce Soviet
cooperation, their response was that internal affairs could force the Soviets
to shut down the Talks. England and France argued that the Two Plus Four Talks
did not have any legal authority to resolve any border issues, which therefore
should be resolved after reunification. In particular, England opposed the
agreement that no international military exercises would take place in former
East German territories until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Issues not resolved at the Two Plus Four
Talks were resolved in later respective bilateral talks held between Germany
and Poland, and Germany and the USSR, such as that of the German-Polish Border
Treaty. After the completion of the Talks there were numerous follow-up
measures: [1] The treaty on several transitional measures signed on October 9th,
1990; [2] the treaty on the
conditions for the temporary presence and the schedule withdrawal of the Soviet
troops from Germany, signed on October 12th, 1990; [3] the Treaty on the
Development of a Comprehensive Cooperation in the Field of the Economy,
Science, and Technology between Germany the USSR signed on November 9th,
1990; [4] the Polish-German Border
Treaty signed on November 14th, 1990; and [5] an agreement to form a
German-USSR Youth Committee, signed on December 7th, 1990.
* The views expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.
