Since President Park Geun Hye made her “Dresden Declaration” in late March, the Kim Jong Eun regime has poured nothing but criticism down upon her. With Pyongyang making strategic hay out of the Sewol ferry sinking to try and incite internecine conflict and shake the foundations of the Park government, inter-Korea relations seem a long way from improving.

Nevertheless, though a new committee designed to prepare for unification hasn’t yet really gotten moving, the South Korean government has been stoic in its approach, and broadly in line with the content of the Dresden Declaration.

At the end of May, Daily NK met with new Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) director Choi Jin Wook, who took up the role in March, to hear about the situation Kim Jong Eun is in today and possible ways forward for unification.

Following hard on the heels of threatening a fourth nuclear test, North Korea has recently been highly critical of the South Korean government over the Sewol ferry tragedy. What do you think is the intention behind it all?

Just as they did with all those nuclear threats in April, the North has been using the Sewol ferry tragedy to attack the South at a time when it is unsettled. It looks as if they are seeking to acquire a card that can be played to get what they want in the event that the attack succeeds. This is the North’s traditional strategy of shaking up the South Korean government by casting inter-Korean relations into crisis while, at the same time, saying they will participate in the Incheon Asian Games and making conciliatory gestures to non-governmental organizations.

Then how should South Korea deal with this?

President Park’s policy toward North Korea is not to give North Korea the inter-Korean relationship it wants, but to forge inter-Korean relations based on common sense and logic. Some say we should accept what the North wants to some degree in order to make relations better, but it is important to follow the logical principle so as to avoid sending the wrong signal to the North. Park’s Dresden Declaration offers the way to better inter-Korean relations as well as Korean unification.

What do you think of the argument that the government needs to withdraw the May 24^th Measures [sanctions imposed following the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010] in order to realize the Dresden Declaration?

That is one part of the Dresden Declaration that North Korea is failing to understand. If the North thinks that way, it must come to the table for dialogue. But what they are doing is just criticizing, which is wrong. Frankly, if [we thought that] cancellation of the May 24^th Measures would have a big influence on improving relations, then we might do it. But the argument that withdrawing them could help improve inter-Korean relation does not make any sense.

Do you think Kim Jong Eun is willing to bring about economic reform?

Not economic reform per se, but his wish for (economic) revitalization seems clear. However, though he is interested in attracting foreign capital, he isn’t putting any effort into improving inter-Korean relations. This is a bad move, because relations between North and South are a major factor for any third country making the decision to invest in North Korea.

It is unimaginable that the North could attract sufficient foreign investment and assistance without considering inter-Korean relations. Kim cannot see this practical difficulty, however, and so no matter how much he may wish for economic improvement, the likelihood of failure remains very high.

Some say the regime has made a soft landing since the execution of Jang Sung Taek [in December 2013]. But all this criticism toward President Park suggests otherwise. What is your view?

The instability has gotten worse, not only economically but also politically. Without a “control tower” after the execution of Jang, the possibility of a consecutive power struggles is high. And from the North’s criticism of  the outside, what we can see is its desire for internal unity. Earlier this year, the North seemed to want to improve inter-Korean relations, but later stopped that as it adjudged that South Korean assistance could harm internal cohesion. That is the dilemma North Korea is facing at this moment.

Is there much chance of a sudden change in North Korea, then?

Rather than measuring the possibility of sudden change, we must simply confirm whether the possibility exists or not. When you are having a fire drill, you don’t measure whether the possibility of fire is 1% or 99% and act accordingly. We need to postulate the simple possibility of the North suddenly changing, and get prepared for it.