Three prominent voices in North Korean affairs convened at the 5th Asian Leadership Conference in Seoul yesterday to energetically debate the dilemmas wrought by the Kim Jong Eun regime.

“In many ways, Kim Jong Eun is smarter than his father,” former South Korean National Security Advisor Chun Young Woo began surprisingly, noting that in his first year of power Kim has fired multiple military octogenarians and replaced them with younger generals. “We must not underestimate him,” Chun alleged. “Kim Jong Eun is the ayatollah of the Kim theocracy.”

According to Professor Moon Chung In of Yonsei University, the regime now appears to be relatively stable.  “We must remember there is no civil society in North Korea,” he explained. “The Worker’s Party subsumed it.  As such there will be no Arab Spring. The only question [for Kim Jong Eun] is how to enhance his performance so he can feed his people.”

However, Michael Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies countered the narrative of potential economic development under Kim. “Keeping people on the brink of starvation is a form of control,” he noted.  Furthermore, “The execution of Jang Sung Taek and the purge of the generals is not a sign of strength, but one of weakness.”

 

Indeed, the purge and execution of Jang Song Taek late last year triggered fierce debate over what the overtly public move can tell the world about the stability of the North Korean regime. Chun argued that Kim Jong Eun is well on his way to consolidating power. “Even before he executed his uncle he eliminated many more thought to be disloyal, or those who could potentially pose a challenge to his unitary leadership,” he said.  

Thus, negotiating with the regime remains a tough road.  “We need to break the pattern where we want a deal more than they do,” Green declared.  “Their pattern is clear.  They always intended to have nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.  Their intent is to be a nuclear weapons state.” 

Chun was scathing about another approach taken toward the North; the Sunshine Policy, of which Professor Moon is a leading proponent.  “It worked, but only in the sense that it strengthened them financially,” he said. “Before we reengage North Korea we should toughen up sanctions against them.  This is our only hope.”

The international sanctions regime is the “biggest barrier to reform,” Moon argued back.  In order to move forward, he said, “We must change North Korea from within, not from without.  Forcing them [through sanctions] won’t do it because they don’t work.”

Several strategies to induce change in the North were posed. However, normalization of relations with the United States was out of the question for Green, as doing so would “acknowledge 20 years of bad behavior and recognize a nuclear state.”  Instead, he stated, “We should continue with both Track 1 and Track 2 dialogue,” and that “South Korea must speak with conviction as a united voice.  The North won’t like that as they depend on South-South conflict.”

“North Korea won’t collapse tomorrow but we need positive strategies to foster change over the long-term,” Chun agreed.  Peaceful reunification can only be viewed as wishful thinking, however, as “there is no reason for them to want it. The definitions of unification are very different for both Koreas.”