What will become of the Kim Jong Eun regime?
How will circumstances in the North change
over the course of the onrushing 2014? Will the internal situation remain
stable, or not? Will Kim Jong Eun raise a solution to the nuclear issue in
discussion with China, and will Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Eun have their first
summit? Alternatively, will Pyongyang ignore the unified denuclearization
demands of South Korea, Japan and the United States, moving instead toward a
fourth nuclear test, a long-range missile test, or further provocations against
the South?
I believe the situation will probably not be
clear and precise, and in the midst of the fog it will be tricky to find a
foothold.
In the short term, Kim Jong Eun’s “politics of
fear” will yield results. A new power elite featuring Choe Ryong Hae, Jo Yon
Jun and Hwang Pyong Seo has reached the pinnacle of state power, and will obey
without question.
But what will be the shape of the power
structure the longer this policy continues? Some things are obvious. First, the
only ones who are free of fear are the Kim family; Jong Cheol, Yeo Jong, and
Seol Song. These people have hidden influence; and will soon emerge into the
power structure. Who else can Kim Jong Eun trust? Lest we should forget, he has
already killed his uncle. There is nobody left outside his immediate family,
and doubts will forever linger, even over the new power elite. Kim will have
them under surveillance, and will grant only a limited degree of trust.
Three years before his passing, Kim Jong Il
began to lay the physical groundwork for the secure succession of power to the
next generation. In 2010 and 2011 he visited China three times, dragging his
ailing self all the way to Yangzhou to try and reconfirm the “bond of blood”
between China and North Korea through an audience with former Chinese leader
Jiang Zemin. The
execution of Jang Song Taek thus marks a stark deviation from the foundations
set during Kim’s lifetime.
The survival of the stable regime that Kim
Jong Il maneuvered into place at that time was based upon maximizing the value
of Pyongyang’s relationship with China. To improve those relations, Kim Jong Il
began to shift away from the military-first line that had been maintained for
the previous 15 years, and onto a line that put the Party first. This fact is
evidenced by the results of the 3rd Party Delegates’ Conference, held on
September 28th, 2010.
Aside from sister Kyong Hui and her husband
Jang Song Taek, who were to look after the young Kim Jong Eun, Kim Jong Il brought in Choe Ryong Hae to
steward the Kim household and control the power of the military. Meanwhile,
technocrats and professional bureaucrats who would not dare to covet the power
of the Kim family were positioned to loyally assist Kim Jong Eun; people such
as Kim Yong Nam, Pak Pong Ju, Pak To Chun, Kim Ki Nam, Choe Tae Bok and Kim
Yang Gon.
And yet, in spite of all this legwork and
power structure craftsmanship, Kim Jong Eun simply killed Jang Song Taek, the
bedrock of his power […], after just two years. Much as Kim Jong Il may have
warned his son against placing excessive trust in Jang, if the elder Kim were
alive today what would he have to say about his son’s foolish move? Like Kim
Jong Il getting himself needlessly bogged down in the mire of the 2009 currency
redenomination, so Kim Jong Eun has recklessly sliced open the artery of his
own power.
In 2014, the power of Kim Jong Eun’s
“fearpolitik” will become all the more evident. The psychological pressure on
the Party, military and people will persist. As, of course, will the
investigation, detention and closed-door execution of the so-called Jang Song Taek
faction.
(To be continued…)
* The viewpoints expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
