A strategist during the Spring and Autumn Period of China’s Eastern Zhōu Dynasty, Son Ja once pointed out, “As long as you thoroughly review the state of the enemy and your forces and only fight when there is a chance of winning, even if you fight a hundred times you will never be in danger.” Conversely, “The chance of winning the battle is halved when you only know your own military state and not that of the enemy”. Lo, it is exceedingly important to understand the enemy’s circumstances precisely.
However, looking back at the history of Korea, it is clear that the importance of identifying the enemy’s state has been ignored for years, something which has led to invasions, ruined lands and enormous human and economic losses. Especially with reference to the Japanese colonial period and the Korean War, Korea was shown to be ignorant of foreign affairs and security. The problem is that it is hard to say with any certainty whether what Korea knows now is all that much greater than what it knew then.
In 1590, Chosun dispatched agents to Japan; however, the returning agents had two different reports about the intention of the Japanese to invade. One, Hwang Yoon Gil reported that the Japanese would soon invade; the other, Kim Sung Il, said that he’d detected nothing and that thus there was nothing to worry about.
Instead of identifying the truth, the Chosun government leaned towards Kim Sung Il’s report based on ‘wishful thinking’ and ordered that preparations for war be stopped.
Worse still, Oh Uk Ryeong was later dismissed from his position for saying that the Japanese invasion would soon come after he had heard from a reliable source that Japan planned to use Korea as a road by which to conquer Ming Dynasty China. As a result, Japan invaded Korea in 1592, people were brutally slaughtered and for seven years the country was racked with war. Approximately 25-30% of the total population is said to have been killed, and some analysts claim that the country’s economy was set back 100 years.
What Son Ja taught us is that if you do not know your enemy’s state then it can jeopardize the fate of your entire country and all the people living in it. However, Chosun Dynasty Korea was still neglecting its duty in the early 20th century when it was finally colonized by Japan. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 also reaffirmed yet again that Korea plays a good ‘frog in a well’, completely ignorant of the outside world.
Six months before the outbreak of war on December 27th, 1949, ROK Army HQ under the leadership of Park Chung Hee, Kim Jong Pil and Lee Young Keun issued a year-end report about the possibility of a North Korean invasion. However, the report was not taken seriously by the government and military leaders. As a result, frontline and many other commanding officers had no grasp or understanding of their mission when North Korea invaded. To make matters worse, just days before war broke out the armed forces withdrew an emergency alert that had been active since June 11th. About 33% of soldiers left for leave on the 24th. When North Korea launched its attack on the 25th, the South Korean army was in a defenseless state and Seoul was occupied in just three days.
Before the outbreak of the war, some South Korean military leaders had said, only half jokingly, “Breakfast in Seoul, lunch in Pyongyang and dinner in Shinuiji.”. Shortly after the war broke out, Shin Sung Mo, the then Minister of National Defense, and Chief of Staff Chai Byung Deok reported that “If we were to take aggressive action, we could retake Pyongyang in a week”. These were big words, a distortion of South Korea’s capabilities. This exemplifies the point; if government and military leaders do not know the enemy’s state and their own capacities, then national security is at very high risk.
South Korea is relatively better informed about North Korea today; however, it still has very limited information regarding North Korea’s capabilities. Following the March 26th, 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, the South Korean government could not identify the cause for a short while, leading two senior officials to say of a rumored torpedo strike, “That is wild speculation. If so, the recovered ship would look very different.”
Despite the fact that the South Korean government had very little information regarding North Korean equipment and ability, on August 14th, 2008, after finding out about Kim Jong Il’s stroke, it said that if any sudden change were to happen in North Korea then the South Korean and U.S. military under the UN would simply occupy North Korea’s major cities, disarm the Chosun People’s Army, offer temporary relief for the North Korean people and bring essential public services.
In keeping with the spirit of “breakfast in Seoul, lunch in Pyongyang and dinner in Shinuiji,” they were wholly overestimating the ability of South Korean troops and underestimating the entire North Korean military. South Korea has been making delusional judgments about the North Korean regime infrastructure and the capabilities of its military for years.
Other than this constant underestimating of the North Korean regime’s powers of survival and capability to attack, the problem is that South Korea has not yet even grasped North Korea’s power structure at all. For example, many South Korean experts consider North Korea’s National Defense Commission to be the top organ of power. However, North Korea’s five major power organs are the Central Committee and Central Military Committee first, then the National Defense Commission, then the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly and lastly the Cabinet. The National Defense Commission holds the highest position among North Korea’s organs of state, but it is subordinate to the Central Committee and Central Military Committee overall.
A good example is that Kim Jong Il’s onsite inspections were always conducted as the Supreme Commander rather than as Defense Commission Chairman, and likewise Kim Jong Eun also conducts his tours as Supreme Commander. North Korea emphasizes the Supreme Commander’s sole leadership of the military, but never that of the ‘National Defense Commission Chairman’. Despite that, not merely a majority of South Korean experts but also a majority of those who would actually have to fight North Korea in a war still believe that the National Defense Commission chairman commands the military.
There are no less serious problems to be found in South Korean judgments regarding the process of the anachronistic 3rd generation succession. In September, 2010, prior to the 3rd Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference, various experts from across the political spectrum thought it ‘false’ and ‘misleading’ to say that Kim Jong Eun would become the successor. Right up until the event itself, experts from at home and abroad were skeptical that North Korea had built the Kim Jong Eun succession system. However, Kim Jong Eun publicly appeared on the political stage, showing himself to be the regime’s no.2.
After Kim Jong Il’s death, Kim Jong Eun swiftly established himself as the leader, but some in the international community still asserted that uncle Jang Sung Taek was ruling as a ‘regent’. Rather than determining the roots of the problem through in depth analysis of the succession system, they took to understanding the situation according to vague and prejudiced ideas about Kim Jong Eun’s youth and lack of experience.
Evidently, South Korea continually fails to fully understand the Stalinist monarchy to its north. Through my Daily NK columns, I would like to overcome these problems step-by-step, looking beyond them to find the best strategy for North Korea going forward.
