Immediately prior to Kim Jong Il’s death, media reports suggested that the United States and North Korea had secretly achieved a breakthrough portending a resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang had reportedly acquiesced to U.S. and South Korean preconditions in return for 240,000 tons of “nutritional assistance.”
Washington and Seoul have long demanded that, prior to their agreeing to return to multilateral nuclear negotiations, Pyongyang must first freeze its uranium enrichment program, allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and pledge no further nuclear and long-range missile tests.
U.S. officials subsequently claimed that the media reports were largely correct, which would represent an uncharacteristic capitulation by Pyongyang. However, other sources indicate the “agreement” was neither as close nor as comprehensive as publicly depicted. North Korea later claimed that the Obama administration had agreed to suspend international sanctions against North Korea in return for Pyongyang temporarily suspending uranium enrichment. U.S. officials deny Pyongyang’s claim.
If the media reports in December were correct, it would reflect a tactical diplomatic breakthrough, though an empty one since Washington would have merely gained North Korean agreement to pledge again to abide by its previous commitments — at the cost of hundreds of thousands of tons of food aid. Moreover, a resumption of the Six-Party Talks merely returns the weary boxers back to the ring at the beginning of long, arduous, and most likely unsuccessful negotiations.
The Obama administration was guardedly optimistic that progress with North Korea was possible if the bilateral meetings had taken place in December. After Kim Jong Il’s death, Pyongyang had indicated it was more focused on the leadership transition and mourning period.
This week’s meeting in Beijing indicates that the new North Korean leadership under Kim Jong Eun is at least willing to re-engage with Washington and has not ruled out diplomacy. For the United States, the meeting in Beijing will be largely exploratory, to discern if Kim Jong Eun is more willing to recommit to North Korea’s denuclearization commitments.
▲ Little hope for progress
The Obama administration does not want to lean too far forward on resuming talks with Pyongyang, predominantly because there is little optimism for success. There are also political concerns against appearing “soft” on North Korea during an election year.
But, the administration fears that abandoning any pretext of dialogue could lead Pyongyang to engage in another dangerous provocation. Yet, equating talking with preventing provocations is a flawed understanding of North Korean history. The regime implements belligerent behavior when it feels it isn’t achieving its objectives, regardless of whether it is engaging in dialogue with Washington or Seoul.
Dialogue should not be seen as a panacea to preventing North Korea’s inherent tendency to utilize both provocations and charm offensives to achieve its objectives. North Korea has made clear in words and deeds that it is determined to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state. It has pursued this goal for decades for its own purposes and not, as some naively asserted, in response to U.S. policies. Nor was Pyongyang willing to abandon these goals when offered economic, security, and diplomatic inducements.
Even when Pyongyang signed agreements to foreswear nuclear ambitions, the regime continued covert programs that violated its commitments. It did so even as it publicly denied cheated, aided by western experts who ridiculed U.S. intelligence assessment that subsequently proved prophetic. Pyongyang’s success in nuclear tests and developing extensive uranium centrifuges makes it even less likely that the regime will negotiate away its nuclear capabilities and ambitions.
Given Pyongyang’s cheating on previous accords, Washington and its allies need to learn from the mistakes of the past and not accept vaguely worded agreements to maintain the semblance of progress. Instead, Washington must insist upon carefully crafted, detailed text that clearly delineates the responsibilities of each participant. In addition, difficulties in monitoring easily hidden uranium facilities would necessitate far more vigorous and intrusive verification measures than were being contemplated when the Six-Party Talks collapsed in 2008.
The Obama administration must also take care to ensure Seoul is not left on the sidelines when engaging North Korea by conditioning progress with Washington on resumed inter-Korean talks. Any hopes for improved South-North Korean relations after Kim Jong Il’s death were quickly dashed by Pyongyang’s steady stream of invective against engaging with President Lee Myung Bak.
North Korea sees the likelihood of a progressive victory in South Korea’s upcoming legislative and presidential elections. The regime knows it can get a far better deal, with fewer strings attached from a progressive South Korean administration. Pyongyang will be reluctant to engage with President Lee Myung Bak’s administration lest it provide any sense of diplomatic victory and boost conservatives’ electoral chances.
