North Korea’s Musudan intermediate-range
ballistic missile reached space and then re-entered Earth’s atmosphere in its
sixth test attempt last week, prompting South Korea, the US, and Japan
immediately denounced the launch, and the UN Security Council quickly published
a statement condemning it as well. International society has shown that it will
not permit North Korea’s provocations.
But we know better. We know that even if
international society condemns North Korea’s actions, they won’t change. The
likelihood of North Korea continuing to test nuclear weapons and medium- and
long-range missiles is high, and even if the UN imposes additional sanctions on
North Korea, it’s uncertain that those sanctions will affect Kim Jong Un’s
government enough to change nuclear development policy. Where, then, does this
situation end?
Certainly, a resolution through dialogue would be
ideal, but what are the chances that will really happen?
We can first imagine a plan to resolve this
issue through dialogue and negotiation. Progressive governments in South Korea
and the US would actively pursue dialogue with North Korea. The era of Kim Dae Jung
and Bill Clinton is a model of this. As relationships between North and South
Korea and between North Korea and the US improve, North Korea would return to
nuclear talks and move forward with peace treaties and the normalization of
ties with the US. Kim Jong Un’s government would move towards reform and an
open market, and if denuclearization and a Korean peace treaty were both
successful, then there would be a sense of peace on the Korean Peninsula. This
is the best possible scenario.
However, at present, there are many doubts
about whether or not this ideal scenario can be carried out. In order for this
scenario to be become a reality, progressive governments in South Korea and the
US that aim for a policy of engagement with North Korea would need to
simultaneously maintain power for at least 10 years, and that would not be an
easy task. After three years of Kim and Clinton, both countries have alternated
between conservative and liberal governments. In South Korea and the US, where
transfer of governmental power occurs in a legitimate manner, it would be
extremely difficult for progressive governments in both countries to
simultaneously maintain power, and engagement with North Korea, for over 10
years.
Kim Jong Un’s regime has strengthened its
intention to make stipulations for nuclear power and continue with nuclear
development. It will not even participate in nuclear discussions. The reason
that relations between North and South Korea and North Korea and the US were
able to improve during the governments of Kim Dae Jung and Bill Clinton is
because at the time, North Korea didn’t outright reject the idea of
denuclearization itself; currently, however, North Korea won’t even consider
the idea, so there’s little chance that relations between South Korea and the
US and North Korea will improve.
With this in mind, can the US accept North
Korea’s possession of nuclear power? This author cannot know if North Korea has
considered the case of India and Pakistan, but North Korea’s situation is
different. The US needed to improve relations with India and Pakistan because
they are regional leaders with a certain amount of influence in South Asia;
however, the practical benefit of the US improving relations with North Korea
is not great. US strategy in Northeast Asia has been to form an alliance with
South Korea and Japan to act as a counterbalance to China, and improving
relations with North Korea will not greatly strengthen its regional influence.
On the other hand, the existence of one
rogue state like North Korea could actually be beneficial to the US. The US
could use North Korean threats as a reason to allot more defense spending and
to increase military power, maintaining its position of worldwide dominance.
Additionally, since US acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear power would give
weight to support for South Korean and Japanese possession of nuclear weapons,
it would be difficult for the US to accept North Korean possession of such
power, even if only to maintain the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to
prevent a nuclear domino effect in East Asia.
‘Balance amidst instability’ in East Asia
If it seems like the current situation in
South Korea, North Korea, and the US will make it difficult to come to a
resolution through dialogue and negotiations, then the next scenario we can
imagine is a continuation of ongoing ambiguity. North Korea continues its
provocative actions, and each time there is a provocation, neighboring
countries and international society enact sanctions that do nothing to stop
North Korea’s actions. The reason that this sort of ambiguous situation is able
to continue is because even though it is unstable, everyone involved has
managed to maintain some sort of balance.
The US says that it is concerned about
North Korean threats, but threats from North Korea have not directly faced the
US. There is still a long way to go before the US seriously recognizes such
threats. Like mentioned above, the US benefits from a security policy that uses
the threat of North Korea to affirm the need for increased military strength.
In China’s case, the existence of North
Korea isn’t detrimental to individual interests. North Korea may be a
frustrating neighbor, but it is an important diplomatic ally in dealing with
the alliance between South Korea, the US, and Japan. Japan is using North Korea
for its own benefit. There’s no better justification to rearm the country than
threats from North Korea. For South Korea, North Korean threats are a security burden,
but that doesn’t mean South Korea is limited by North Korea. North Korean
threats are a constant, and people are used to living their lives amongst such
threats.
In sum, North Korea’s neighbors, including
South Korea, may feel somewhat insecure, but continuing with the status quo
does not greatly inconvenience them. Economically speaking, this could be
called ‘balance amidst instability.’
If the balance breaks, crisis
The problem is what happens if the balance
breaks. If North Korea heightens its provocations and goes beyond what
neighboring countries can tolerate, dynamics will change as we try to find a
new balance point amidst crisis.
For example, if a North Korean
intercontinental ballistic missile lands off the West Coast of the US, near Los
Angeles, the US will no longer be able to maintain current “strategic
patience.” Public opinion will quickly call to settle the matter by any means
possible, and if this increases threat of war on the Korean peninsula, then
China will not be able to remain a bystander.
If the crisis reaches a peak and political ground in East Asia loses its balance, there is a high probability that the
governments of powerful countries, particularly the US and China, will take
action to change the situation. This US- and China- based movement will
continue until all neighboring countries find a new balance point that is at
least somewhat acceptable.
What’s key is whether or not Kim Jong Un
will break the current ‘unstable balance.’ We don’t know if he’ll be as skilled
as his father, Kim Jong Il, at hit-and-run strategy, but if his own
inexperience causes him to break the balance, the Korean peninsula will be in
crisis, and chances are high that powerful countries will take action in a
manner similar to after Korean liberation in 1945. Will Kim Jong Un really do
so? It remains to be seen.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.
