The curtains have come down on North Korea’s 7th Korean
Workers’ Party Congress, the first such gathering in 36 years. The Party
Congress, coupled with North Korea’s recent nuclear provocations, were enough
to draw in significant domestic and international attention to Pyongyang. The
Congress started on May 6th, and continued for four days until the closing
ceremony on May 9. However, if you exclude reporting events and after-meal
events, the real heart of the Congress took place over two days, from May 7 to May 8. Most media reports have indicated that apart from the regime’s
claim to nuclear power status, not much has changed since the last Party
Congress took place over three decades ago. We can, however, see the 7th Party
Congress as the opening act for Kim Jong Un’s reign. We can divide the related
content into a few major themes in order to derive meaning from the event’s
implications.
First, Kim Jong Un’s ascension to chairman of the Korean
Workers’ Party is official recognition of his rise to the top post. Second,
through the Party Congress, Kim Jong Un consolidated his leadership and
prompted a generational shift in the upper echelons of the Party structure.
Third, Kim attended to the relationship between the Party and the military and
proclaimed the North’s status as a nuclear power. Last, we were able to see
signs that describe a transition from socialism to market economics and a
reorganization of external relations. Overall, the event was about marking the
start of the Kim Jong Un era.
The opening of the new era means that Kim Jong Un will
distinguish himself from Kimilsungism, Kimjongillism, Juche [self-reliance and
nationalist ideology], and Songun [military first policy] by emphasizing his
own brand of leadership, which focuses on an ideology related to the “love of
the people.” In a speech on October 10th for Party Foundation Day, Kim Jong Un
emphasized this notion instead of talking about Juche. He repeated the phrase
inmin [the people] over and over, making it a theme. By applying this change in
the ideological culture, he hopes to change the thinking of North Korean people
in general.
Moreover, because Kim Jong Un has not inherited the throne
with the same fluid transition as his father and does not yet have firm control
of the military, he is choosing to separate the administrative organizations of
the Party and the military. He is doing this instead of emphasizing Songun
policies. Existing secretariats have been replaced by Kim Jong Un’s “Advance
Guard,” providing ample evidence that Kim Jong Un’s era has truly arrived.
As the secretariats were replaced, Kim Jong Un’s aunt Kim
Kyong Hui lost her official position. Officials who were promoted to the head
administrative posts as part of the move include Choe Ryong Hae, Kim Ki Nam,
Choi Tae Bok, Ri Su Yong, Kim Pyong Hae, O Su Yong, Kwak Bum Ki, Kim Yong Chol,
and Ri Man Gon.
As the Central Committee’s Secretariat titles have changed,
the power of the positions seems to have increased. This has created a change
in the status and structure of positions inside the Party. Through the
increased power of the secretariat positions, the proportion of highly ranking
officials in the Party, administration, and military have been brought into
proportion, creating a political normalcy. From this vantage, the revolutionary
approach of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il has taken a back seat. That said, this
author does not think it accurate to say that these traditional organizations
are being cast out entirely. Severing the link to his father and grandfather’s
traditions in order to institute the name change of the Party titles would be
politically burdensome, and not enough time has past to do so.
In addition, although North Korea creates tremendous trouble
in the international community through its nuclear development and testing, we
have to reconsider the notion that nukes are nothing but weapons to the North
Korean regime. Kim Jong Il’s Songun politics has transformed into Songun
culture, which has influenced various sectors, including politics and the daily
lives of North Korean people. On the one hand, nuclear weapons are a bargaining
chip that North Korea can use in interactions with the outside world. At the
same time, nuclear technology holds a political significance to many North
Koreans. Nuclear weapons are as iconic and important to the country’s ideology
as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. They accord North Koreans with a sense of
kinship during times of hardship and difficult circumstances.
By making this type of structural adjustment, Kim Jong Un
can argue that becoming a nuclear power contributes to world peace. He is most
likely gearing up to attempt to re-enter the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
This does not mean that Kim Jong Un is ready to give up his nukes, but rather
than he is ready to step up in the name of non-proliferation for the sake of
peace in Northeast Asia. Before the fourth nuclear test on January 6, North
Korea felt out negotiations with America through unofficial channels. This
paints in a new light the missile launches and other shows of armed strength
that the regime conducted before the Party Congress. To resolve the current
standoff between the regime and the outside world with regards to the nuclear
test and resulting sanctions, the regime might negotiate with America under the
table or reach out to President Xi Jinping about attempting to block the
installment of THAAD in South Korea to improve relations with China.
There is also the possibility that as Kim Jong Un moves past
his fifth year as leader, he will attempt to add momentum to Vietnamese or
Chinese-style economic changes. In the past, five- year and seven-year economic
plans were put forward, extending the ten core principles of socialism. But this time
around, Kim Jong Un opted for a five-year economic plan. In particular, the
time after Kim Jong Un stepped up to the throne has been called the era of
resident led marketization. The social status of the merchant class [known as
donjuLiterally "masters of money," donju refers to people who hav... More, or money masters] has risen meteorically. The regime will likely
introduce specific measures that recognize and protect the advances made by
these entrepreneurs.
We should look to previous examples of how donjuLiterally "masters of money," donju refers to people who hav... More were
included in the class structure of transitioning countries. In these countries,
the donjuLiterally "masters of money," donju refers to people who hav... More were called “red capitalists.” We need to pay sharp attention to how
the activity of these red capitalists in North Korea affects the regime’s
maintenance and consolidation of power and authority. The way these changes
take place has implications for the ownership system, particularly for the
concept of private ownership. The incidence of corruption and illegal behavior
is likely to be rampant. The way the regime re-asserts control and maintains
authority in these new fields is pivotal for the trajectory of the country as a
whole.
Kim Jong Un is likely to reconstruct the nascent market economy in order to lay the legal blueprints down for economic changes that resemble
those undertaken by socialist China and Vietnam. In addition, the regime is
likely to reorganize the disappointing special economic zones, which have
failed to bring about the large-scale international trade that they anticipated.
At the same time, Pyongyang will likely try to change up relations with South
Korea and America by opting for a strategy involving both toughness and
moderation.
With the recent nuclear test, North Korea was able to
successfully communicate to the world that it is in fact a nuclear power and
forced China to view it in a different light. North Korea was able to iron out
differences with China over issues such as North Korea’s ranking in the
international pecking order and Beijing’s neglect for North Korea-Chinese trade
now that South Korea-Chinese trade has become so robust. It was able to do this
by forcing the issue of THAAD, which China opposes and America supports, as an
issue of contention between the United States and China. Through the Party
Congress, North Korea will advance on its military, diplomatic, and economic
plans. Nuclear weapons have thus helped North Korea to achieve an elevated
international position and domestic political security.
Ever since Kim Jong Il died on December 17, 2011, Kim Jong
Un has received harsh criticism over his domestic and international policies,
but when we compare the situation as it exists today to what it was like before
Kim Jong Un inherited the country, we are witnessing relative stability. In addition,
we have seen some significant changes in the economic realm, particularly in the sanctioning and proliferation of an official general market system. Through these changes, we can see that some form of a socialist market economy is slowly
taking shape. Unofficial economic changes towards marketization have
become officially recognized by the regime. This demands attention.
The fact that North Korean residents voluntarily participate
in the market economy–official and unofficial– has significance for the
marketization of North Korea, but there is also something to be said for the
fact that as the regional official general markets increase in size and number,
the very nature of this marketization is taking on uniquely North Korean
characteristics. As North Korea’s system molds to absorb,
integrate, and develop the market economy, this has meant increased confidence
for the Chinese traders doing business with North Korean merchants and
companies.
When we look at North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, which
occurred on January 6, 2016, their missile launches, and the changing of their
standard time on August 15, 2015, we can see that Kim Jong Un’s policies are
aimed at “globalizing” North Korea with the appearance of a whole and independent
nation. Looking back, we can see that North Korea has adhered to the Byungjin Line, or simultaneously pursuing economic and nuclear/military development. This
delineates a shift away from the ideological and strategic culture of North
Korea in the past, which focused on concepts such as Juche, Songun,
Kimilsungism, and Kimjongilism. However, despite this progress, it is still
unknown if North Korea will commit to fundamental economic reforms in the road
ahead.
It is worth pointing out that this success is not highly
related with armed provocations such as missile launches and nuclear tests. The
important thing is to collect all the relevant information in order to
determine the regime’s intentions so that we can come up with an appropriate
international response when North Korea comes knocking at the door. We need to
continue to analyze and unpack Kim Jong Un’s latest actions: Why did he host
the first Party Congress in 36 years and what can we infer from its
developments? What are the prospects for a fifth nuclear test? If the
international community really wants to contribute to the peace of Northeast
Asia, we need to prepare to face a nuclear-armed yet reform-oriented North
Korea.
If we suppose that Kim Jong Un will lead the country with as
firm a hand as his father, this author would like to ask how we are preparing
to deal with the specific characteristics of a state under Kim Jong Un’s
control and influence. During the past 70 years of division of the Korean Peninsula, what were our mistakes? Have we used the “international context” as
a convenient excuse to put off the project of unification? We need to think
about these matters with the same seriousness and attention that we have given
to the Party Congress.
*The views and opinions expressed in this column are the
author’s alone. They do not necessarily reflect the position of Daily NK.
