I.
North Korea’s most recent suite of nuclear
and missile provocations, carried out in close connection to each other in time
for New Year’s Day and the Lunar New Year holiday, appear to have succeeded
only now in making the public and politicians in the South aware of Pyongyang’s
actual nuclear ambitions. With this, it also reaffirms just how naive a policy
South Koreans had maintained toward North Korea and unification. This includes
President Park Geun Hye’s “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,”
which had declared provocations from the North would be met by strong
countermeasures from the South.
In a country that has a five-year
single-term president in office, policies that are based on simple visions and
hopes, reflected in words like ‘sunshine,’ ‘denuclearization and openness,’ and
‘trust,’ are destined to fail. Over the past decade, we’ve wasted so much
precious time, but now is not the time to get caught up in a blame game.
Rather, it is time to look at whether the country has 12 remaining vessels
(reference from battle Korea’s Admiral Yi Sun-sin put up against Japanese
invaders) it can use to turn the tides.
First, we should briefly look at why the
North launched its ‘Kwangmyongsong 4,’ which it claims was to put a satellite
in orbit. It is well known that the technology for an intercontinental
ballistic missiles [ICBM] and satellite rocket boosters are the same. In a 2013
new year’s concert put on by Moranbong Band, the backdrop images used for the
song ‘Without a Break’ include those from the launch of ‘Unha 3’ carrying the
‘Kwangmyongsong 3’ satellite. What follows the launch is the satellite
separating from the space launch vehicle [SLV], achieving stable orbit, and
then falling back to Earth only to end in a computer-graphics-generated large
explosion on mainland U.S. soil.
U.S. media may have reported that at “no
point after the launch did the Kwangmyongsong 4 threaten the safety of the
United States,” but Kim Jong Un has from three years ago made no effort to hide
the fact that he is developing nuclear warheads to threaten mainland America.
Given the Moranbong girl group is considered the official propaganda performance
group of Kim Jong Un, the graphics used as the backdrop can no doubt have no
discrepancy with his underlying intentions.
Kim Jong Un’s ambitions on launching a
nuclear attack against the U.S. mainland were unveiled after the North carried
out its third nuclear test in 2013. The actual goal of this would be to ‘break
the backbone’ of South Korea’s national defense and ‘enslave’ the population
down South under its totalitarian rule. In other words, the ultimate goal of
the North’s nuclear development is to ‘without a break’ unify the Koreas by
force. From this viewpoint, statements such as those issued by Spokesman Kim
Sung Ju from The Minjoo Party of Korea claiming the launch was for
‘domestic political stability’ are a cover-up driven by political calculations.
II.
How will South Korea respond to nuclear
threats from the North? What needs to first be made clear is who will be the
party responding to these nuclear threats. Throughout the history of nuclear
development and threats by the North, the greatest problem is that the South
Korean government refused a proposal led by the U.S. to bomb the North’s
Yongbyon nuclear facility and also forgot it should be the party engaged in
this nuclear game. Not only that, for the past ten years, we had to watch past
presidents turn a blind eye to Pyongyang’s nuclear development, blinded by
their own ideological biases, or distort the reasons of why it is carrying out
such actions. To be precise, those ideas put forward carried the exact same
logic as that touted by the North’s propaganda department. The South no longer
has the luxury to do so. The South Korean government and president must take
the lead in resolving the nuclear issue, and in order to do so, it must
differentiate what it can and cannot expect from surrounding countries and the
North Korean leadership.
The most important fact is that unless it
is facing the threat of collapse, North Korea will never give up its nuclear
weapons. Thus, in order to dismantle its nuclear program that means we must push
the North towards the brink of collapse. If the prospect of that is too
frightening we must live with nuclear weapons above our heads only to later
become slaves of the leadership. If being subject to unification by force is
not considered an acceptable option, we must develop a strategy that can drive
the North to the edge of a cliff. From a military standpoint, that would be to
devise a tactic of preemptive attack to bring down the leadership, and from a
perspective of peace, it would be to a
continual strategy that will act as a strong deterrent against the threat of
war. What’s important is that both options should not be on the table. It is
unquestionable that the latter should be the one being reviewed.
For convenience sake, let’s refer to the
principle for denuclearization led by the South: the ‘strategy of integration.’
We then need to assess what we can and cannot expect from the U.S. and its
nuclear umbrella, joint defense, and economic sanctions for denuclearization;
Japan and its sanctions; a joint military, information system among Korea, the
U.S., and Japan; as well as the United Nations and its resolutions on North
Korea, and what importance this all has along with its limitations.
Denuclearization in the passive sense means defending the country against
nuclear attacks, and in the active sense means to completely dismantle nuclear
arms in the North. It’s a given that we must aim to attain both goals. As much
as no one expects loudspeaker broadcasts into the North to resolve the nuclear
problem, in the same vein, the U.S.’ nuclear umbrella and THAAD deployment are
also not seen as fundamental solutions to the problem. What we need is an
‘integrated strategy’ that combines all possible means that we have into one,
in effect creating a ‘cocktail strategy.’ In order to do so, what we need is
for the South Korean government to take the lead and for the public and media
to impart their wisdom to overcome this national crisis. (Under current
circumstances, it is nothing but a waste of time to expect any participation
from the National Assembly.)
Up until now, all countries around the
world have dealt with the nuclear issue as if it’s ‘homework that no one wants
to do.’ This is because the South Korean government has left it to be that way by
giving up on taking the lead. North Korea and unification policies have always
been embellished with beautiful language that’s full of hope and vision for the
future but lacking in methodology, and this has crippled practical and creative
thinking. It is not only the Ministry of Unification that is obsessed with
inter-Korean exchanges that is the problem but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which has also displayed the same obsession with flowery language. In January
last year, the foreign ministry brought up the ‘Korean Formula,’ which claimed
to be based on ‘trust and the virtuous circle,’ but it had no real content to
back this up.
This is especially true when it comes to Kaesong
Industrial Park, the role of which was wrongly defined from the beginning. The complex is neither a successful
example of inter-Korean economic cooperation, nor a means of applying critical
pressure on the North Korean leadership. In fact, the South and its people
based in Kaesong have become hostages of the industrial park.
Considering the size of South Korea’s
economy, what the companies operating out of Kaesong park account for is tiny,
yet they have reduced the range of policies for national security for the
government, arguing the park ‘unconditionally be maintained’ for the sake of
their own interests. Also, the unification ministry maintains that since
Kaesong was excluded from the May 24 sanctions initiated by the Lee Myung Bak
administration, that must also be the same for UN economic sanctions as well,
without explaining why it must be considered an exception from the May 24
measures to begin with.
As a result, the park has produced what’s known as the
‘Stockholm syndrome’ under which hostages end up having feelings of affection
for their own captors and instead prevented the South Korean government and its
people from coming together to rally against threats from the North. Not only
that, despite all of the international sanctions, the South has dispelled the
urgency and importance of resolving the North’s nuclear problem by continuing
operations at the park despite being the victim. While doing so, it has with no
shame demanded that China unleash harsher economic sanctions such as cutting
off its oil supply to the North in a form of self-centered state egoism. If the
South’s national security is compromised, there will be no KIC, but
the park itself can at any point be reopened and expanded once the nuclear
issue is resolved. As is the case now, if the means and ends are mistaken, the
state ends up running amok.
Ever since Yi Song Gye (founder of the
Joseon Dynasty) at the end of the Goryeo Dynasty turned back his troops at
Wihwa Island (leading to a revolution that dethroned the king of Goryeo and led
to the foundation of Joseon), the Korean people have failed to seize the reins
and resolve national crises in a proactive manner. Seemingly as a result,
politicians threw everything aside to engage in party battles and political
strife internally, but externally, they put the public in inexplicable pain by
displaying weakness and unfounded optimism toward threats and attacks. Looking
at politicians of the present day, it is hard not to acknowledge that nothing
has changed. However, according to “The Chronicles of the Three States,” under
the Silla Dynasty that brought about unification everyone came together to
build the Namhansanseong Fortress and successfully fought against the Tang
Dynasty. At times of risk, what South Korea’s political leaders need to first
do is not engage in political scheming but galvanize uncompromising
determination.
III.
The next aspect that needs to be completely
reassessed is the role of China in North Korea’s nuclear issue. A lot of
countries still hold onto some hope that China will play a positive role in
resolving the nuclear problem. This is because they believe Beijing has the key
to solving this question in ‘one go.’ However, following North Korea’s nuclear
tests, rocket launches, the Cheonan sinking, and the bombing to Yeonpyeong
Island, China has ordered, “Related parties to stand in positions of peace and
stability for the Korean Peninsula and respond in a cool-headed manner.” In
response to the discussion about deploying the THAAD system to the South, it
has said, “When one country is pursuing its own safety, it must not impede the
interests and safety of another.” Simply put, it wants the South and the U.S.
to sit on their hands and discuss the nuclear issue within the China-led
six-party talk framework.
However, this order from a superpower is
something to be put out after China itself takes its own advice at least once
in the South China Sea dispute. Not only that, based on the past proceedings of
the six-party talks and the response Beijing showed after Pyongyang’s third and
fourth nuclear test, we can lay out a very clear standard on what its role is
and where China stands. That would be ‘we must not listen to its words but look
at its actions.’ If we were to only look at China’s actions, we can consider
the country to be willingly allowing North Korea’s nuclear development. Despite
this, America’s past administrations and the South Korean government have yet
to give up on their hope that ‘just maybe’ things might be different based on
China’s words that it “supports denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.’”
The problem lies within China’s outdated
way of thinking, rooted in the belief that the world revolves around it, and
that its safety depends on managing its borders; but no small number of Chinese
dynasties ended up being short-lived because they were unable to respond with
flexibility to changes in the expansive interior regions that lay within and beyond the borders. China,
as it shares border with the North along the Amnok River, has claimed the fate
of the two countries are tied, but if Chinese leaders are unable to decide
which Korea to side with despite the erosion of economic borders and trade with
the South that mounts to some hundreds of billions of dollars, that is its own
problem.
Seoul should now stop thinking of China as
the ‘variable of hope’ but the ‘invariable of negligence’ when it comes to
Beijing’s role in denuclearization and pursue a ‘strategy of integration’
centered on Seoul-Washington-Tokyo. The U.S. may not agree with this shake-up
in strategy, but the South needs to be able to push forward with a change in
direction, and this is possible. This is because in order for Seoul to set
Beijing aside in the nuclear game with the North, it need not make any demands
or apply any pressure on China. In fact, if China raises questions about
diplomatic formalities and steps up political and economic pressure, that is to
be welcome. It will in effect make it evident where China is putting its own
stance in 21C Northeast Asia. Only when China asks to play a role in the game
of North Korea’s nuclear affairs will we then extend an invitation, which
demands the strongest sanctions possible against Pyongyang.
IV.
What’s important is for the South to secure
a ‘game changer’ in resolving the nuclear problem. This is of course part of
the ‘integration strategy,’ and Seoul must proactively taking part in
bilateral, multilateral, and UN-issued measures to guarantee war deterrence as
well as integrated defense, and economic sanctions against its nuclear program.
In addition to that, the South must secure its own tool of leverage against the
North..
Flooding the North with information via TV
and radio broadcasts, and WiFi; establishing an information network with North
Korea people; invigorating the North’s grassroots market economy; providing
systematic and comprehensive education and help for defectors and their
everyday lives; aiding North Korean diplomats in seeking asylum, all of the
aforementioned, are measures that only the South can engage in. These strategies
are all peaceful in nature and sustainable, and they do not pose threats to any
country under normal conditions, meaning they will not trigger criticism from
others. This is why there is no need to refer to broadcasts into the North as
‘psychological warfare.’ West Germany had for long broadcast into the East, but
it did not call it ‘psychological warfare.’ Rather than branding it that, the
South should call it ‘offering access to information’ or simply a ‘system of
information exchange between the Koreas.’
If this strategy is used alongside the
immensely strong military deterrence provided by the South Korea-U.S. alliance
coupled with the network among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, it will in the
long run lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime and provide the
cultural and emotional foundation for peaceful unification. Moving forward from
that, if the information exchange system is continually strengthened, the
leadership will face a fearsome tsunami triggered by open access to
news from the world outside. This is because, as rightly pointed out by Hannah Arendt,
totalitarianism is based on a fictional foundation. An exchange in information
will bring down the pillars upholding the North’s suryong society and its
totalitarian leadership.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
