I. North Korea’s Existence as Frog in a
Well
North Korea conducted a nuclear test on
January 6th. Political authorities in North Korea have declared, “With the
successful test of a hydrogen bomb, we have joined the league of nations with
thermonuclear capabilities.” Upon hearing this news and listening to the
domestic and international reaction to it, the author is reminded of the
chairperson of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s protest that “Enough
is enough!” in the U.N. General Assembly. This frustration does not simply come
from the fact that we’ve past the point of tolerable offenses from our northern
neighbors. It’s also because we’ve past the point where we can stand to sit
back and listen to the reaction of the Korean government, media, and North
Korea experts. Looking back at our reactions after the first four nuclear
tests, it had become extremely simple to anticipate the exact content of future
messages when and if a fifth test occurs in the future.
Through the U.N. Security Council, the
South Korean government has ensured there will be stiff punishment in the event
of North Korean provocation. But to be frank, when officials and diplomats say
these sorts of things, it’s important to note that the U.N. has no military
power to speak of and sanctions are not very effective. On the other hand, the
fact that Kim Jong Un made no mention of nuclear weapons in his New Year’s
speech, and then suddenly conducted a test might be looked at by some as an
indicator of North Korea’s unpredictable nature.
But that’s not the case. We saw this 4th
test coming from a mile away. In the beginning of this year, the present author
appeared at Unification Media Group and said, “As we enter into the latter
portion of South Korean President Park Geun Hye’s term, we should expect
to see the North pick up their provocations. The likelihood of a nuclear test
is therefore higher.”
If we look carefully, Kim Jong Un did
actually make a reference to nuclear weapons in his 2016 New Year’s address:
“During the celebration in October across Kim Il Sung Square, canvases were
hung up featuring nuclear explosions and satellites in orbit. But Kim Jong Un
made reference to a capacity that could dwarf those capacities and shake the
world. The phrasing was, ‘Even if the heavens fall, a nuclear power remains.’”
Viewed carefully, these words should have
been carefully interpreted as Kim Jong Un’s justification for continuing
nuclear development and a harbinger of future tests. Yeong Gi Jo, professor of
North Korean Studies at Korea University, said, “For North Korea, there is a
close association between the New Year’s Address and the nuclear test, which
followed one another in quick succession.”
We have already known for a long time that
December and January are the perfect time for ballistic missile launches and
nuclear tests. As U.N. sanctions are discussed and come into effect, North
Korea declares, ‘Prepare for nuclear war!’ and drives its people into a state
of emergency on the brink of full scale conflict. But then, a little bit before
farming season starts, the Chinese say, ‘We need to find a peaceful solution to
the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.’ At the same time, U.N. sanctions
start to fizzle out. We need to look at these nuclear tests as one event in a
larger series of events.
Among the experts who believe we should no
longer tolerate the nuclear tests, some are saying, “Since the tests are
designed to help entrench North Korea’s leadership in their positions of power,
they are taking non-military methods to gain the attention of the U.S.” If we
take the nuclear test and NK’s nuclear power status itself at face value, then
it seems like this is the case. Such an argument is consistent with the idea
that North Korea develops and tests nuclear weapons for use in a war against
the U.S. or Japan. The reason that this position is illogical is clear: the
regime uses nuclear weapons as a survival tactic, plain and simple.
Some continue to believe that the North’s
nuclear capacity is designed to threaten the South or even as preparation for
an invasion. People still judge that the North’s continuation of nuclear
development during the Sunshine era of renewed inter-Korean relations was a
strategic miscalculation. The truth about North Korea’s nuclear tests is an
uncomfortable one. Because of the failure of the Sunshine Policy to
denuclearize North Korea, South Koreans have become desensitized to the issue.
The people have also lost interest in these sorts of brinksmanship games.
However, through it all, the Kim Regime has remained. By using nuclear tests
over the last ten years, the North has successfully managed to stay alive by
surviving as a frog in a well.
II. The Cause and Consequences of Ignoring
the North’s Nuclear Tests
But if that is the truth, then how did the
situation devolve into the current mess? The reason is that as a result of the
Sunshine Policy, it became much more difficult to respond with force to nuclear
tests and provocations. For example, we need to look more closely at the
domestic opposition response to former South Korean President Lee Myeong Bak’s
“Hard Line” strategy. In South Korea, if you don’t defend the North Korean
point of view, support North Korea in any way, and don’t show any interest in
the North, then you are labeled as someone who is in line with the ‘Hard Line’
policy. But in the climate of South Korea’s endless elections, would it really
be possible for a candidate to propose having friendly relations with the
North? This is a beautiful idea, but the simple truth is that the proposition
has become an illogical one because of this climate.
The problem with pursuing friendly ties
with North Korea is the methodology. From Kim Young Sam’s administration to
Park Geun Hye’s, there are a few important differences, but there are three
problematic premises that have remained:
(1) North Korea will respond to the South’s
goodwill by reciprocating it
(2) The main lever for inducing action is
economic support
(3) In pursuing friendly relations, the
South should avoid attempting to destabilize the North
All three of these premises are
problematic. There are countless instances of North Korea responding to the
South’s goodwill by ignoring it or provoking the South. Further, the idea that
in order to maintain their preeminence, the North Korean authorities need
financial assistance from the South is overly simple and not entirely true.
There is evidence that the North earns an annual sum of 200-400 million dollars
in foreign currency. If South Korean financial support really was
necessary to upkeep the political stability of the regime, then how have they
held onto power for the last 8 years? By selling minerals, exporting human
labor, and the continued economic development of Pyongyang, the regime has
survived despite the suspension of funds from the South. The suggestion that
North Korea is dependent on its Southern neighbor is unfounded. So it is
important that we do not conflate the idea that North Korea wants South Korean
money with the idea that it needs it in order to stay in power.
Lastly, the best method to bring the North
Koreans to the negotiating table is to try to exacerbate their weaknesses. The
South’s usage of propaganda loudspeakers in the DMZ during the August landmine
incident is a good example of that principle. The North was put at ease when
the megaphone broadcasts were stopped through negotiations, and it is in that
relaxed atmosphere that they conducted the nuclear test. We can thus conclude
that it is only when the South has the power to influence the fate of the
regime that North Korea faces up to the South on sincere terms.
North Korea has been able to take advantage
of one of the South Korean government core structural weaknesses: the one term
limit on the office of the president. North Korea ignored South Korea’s
suggestion of good neighbor relations through inaction. The North has been able
to take advantage of the difficulty facing late term and early term presidents
when they attempt a transition in their unification strategy. By using
provocations during such periods, they’ve been able to extract large amounts of
financial support. Kim Dae Jung and
Roh Moo Hyun’s administrations are good
illustrations, particularly the moment when the late president signed a
peace declaration with Kim Jong Il on October 4th, 2007. If South Korea had
made stronger preconditions for the economic aid, the North would never have
been able to respond to the friendly neighbor policy with inaction and outright
provocation. North Korea’s provocations to Lee Myeong Bak’s South Korea in
subsequent years are examples of this.
Park Geun Hye’s policy stressing the “Trust
Building Process” is certainly not immune from falling into the same exact
traps that other administrations have fallen victim to. There are weaknesses of
the “Trust Building Process” strategy that relate to the one term limit of the
Korean presidency. If the current administration’s strategy is effective,
that is evidence that the hard line policy of the previous administration is
not receiving serious criticism inside Korea. But the current
administration’s policies will never be enough to solve the nuclear problem.
When it comes to peninsular policy and
unification strategies, the most effective method is to reach consensus with
the surrounding nations in order to expose and take advantage of North Korea’s
vulnerabilities. This way the South can secure the leadership position in
North-South relations. So if we were to talk specifics, what methods could the
South use given the current political climate? The single best method is to
increase the quantity and quality of outside information that reaches inside
North Korea’s borders. This is not limited to loudspeaker broadcasts at the
DMZ. It should also encompass efforts spanning from TV to radio and wireless
internet in order to extensively infuse the North with outside ideas and
information. Additionally, we need to re-tool and modernize Korean Broadcasting
System’s (KBS) One People Radio (Han Minjok Bangsong) broadcasting to North
Korea. While it currently reaches a wide audience, it suffers from poor
quality. We need to revamp it in order to grab the hearts and minds of everyday
North Korean people. In the road ahead, we need to design and implement a
system wherein we can use Hallyu (international popularity of South Korean cultural content) information to stimulate
the imagination and repressed opinions of North Korean residents.
There have been suggestions that South
Korea should confront the North Korean nuclear threat by means of a Kill Chain,
high altitude missile defense system (THAAD), or through the development of our
own nuclear weapons technology. Of course, in terms of physical defenses,
these are not preposterous suggestions. However, it would be a grave
miscalculation to disregard the impact of information distribution. That’s
because the weaponized defense solutions to the North’s provocations will
amplify the South’s security, but they do not represent fields in which the
South can take the lead in peacefully reducing the lifespan of the regime.
Although, we must admit there are those who categorize information
distribution as an act of military aggression since it does present such a
grave threat to the lifeblood of the regime.
However, we have entered into a time period
wherein it is extremely difficult for the North to respond effectively to a
massive information dump. That is because, in the wake of their ballistic
missile launches and nuclear tests, they are on the receiving end of intense
scrutiny from the U.N. and the international community at large. To judge North
Korea’s strategic outlook at this point, some are suggesting that even China is
considering changing their normal tactic of using passive means to influence
their ally to cease nuclear tests by taking a bit of a harder line. In
such a climate, North Korea has to understand that responding to a massive
information transfusion from South Korea with a military provocation would
certainly invite major instability and potentially signal the end of the Kim
Regime. That’s why this is the perfect time for South Korea to use peaceful, punitive
measures.
It might also be prudent to look into the
benefits of potentially closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex. On the one
hand, there are calls for strong retaliatory responses to the nuclear test. On
the other hand, the fact that South Korea sends 1,100 voluntary hostages to
help North Korea earn foreign currency to fund their nuclear development is
enough to cast doubt on the sincerity of the United Nations sanctions against
North Korea that the South Korean government supports. The more difficult and
complex a problem is, the more important it is to look for ways to simplify it.
The Park Geun Hye government has an excellent opportunity to do just that in
2016.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
