The separated family reunions that took
place at North Korea’s Mt. Kumkang from October 20 to
26 came to an end with no outstanding problems. There was some noise about
Pyongyang’s authorities censoring laptops of
journalists on site, but the event itself concluded smoothly as assessed by
many. This means the North was mostly cooperative when it came to the reunions
themselves, raising the question for many of what Pyongyang’s
calculations were in allowing them.
No one will argue against the idea of
reunions for war-torn families being a humanitarian issue, but from the North’s point of view, it is hard to deny that this, too, will be a
political issue that requires some flicking on the abacus. This is because, as
it trails behind the South in almost all fields including politics, economics,
social and cultural strength, family reunions become virtually the only
negotiating card for the North.
Once family members in the North meet with
their more affluent kin in the South, it is only natural that it stirs up some
sense of agitation. Despite this, Pyongyang is willing to take on that extra
risk and agree to reunions as a means to dialogue with Seoul.
Even under the administrations of late
Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, which enjoyed more amicable ties with
the North, the reason why they were able to continue holding reunions
consistently is because of the rice and fertilizer aid being shipped up north
each year. A former high-level official from the Ministry of Unification once
told this reporter, “The core of South-North relations
even during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations hinged upon the
idea of providing rice and fertilizer in return for family reunions.”
In other words, from a political
perspective, family reunions are a bargaining chip the North can yield to the
South, but what would it have gained for this recent round? In order to put the
currents of change into context, we will examine the overall conditions that
unfolded after the South’s National Security Advisor
Kim Kwan Jin and the North’s Director of the Korean
People’s Army General Political Bureau Hwang Pyong So
met and produced the 8.25 Inter-Korean Agreement.
What the North has gained and conceded following
the 8.25 agreement
Following the 8.25 agreement, largely
speaking, Pyongyang has made concessions on two points: delaying its long-range
rocket launch and holding family reunions. As to why the reunions are seen as a
concession, I have explained above. When it comes to the rocket launch, based
on the fact that Pyongyang indicated it would but did not, it can be seen as a
move of backing down, regardless of whether it actually had intentions to see
the launch through.
What would the North have gained from
taking one step back on these issues? First, there was China’s standing committee member of the Communist Party Liu Yunshan’s visit to Pyongyang, which signals the North has managed somewhat
to put relations with Beijing back on track. It will be hard for Pyongyang to
completely return relations to the past so long as it keeps pushing for nuclear
arms development, but the visit from China’s high-level
official can be seen as a win the North, as it gives it the opportunity to tout
to the rest of the world that its bilateral ties with Beijing are not facing
any major difficulties.
Along with Liu’s
visit, another attempt that the North made was opening up a stage for peace
talks with Washington. The North issued a statement from its foreign ministry
both on October 7 and 17 — a high-level channel of communication — demanding
talks on a peace treaty. From its end, it was urging the U.S. to show sincerity
towards the idea of discussing signing a peace treaty in return for its gesture
towards dialogue, expressed through its halt on test-firing a long-range
rocket. However, a frosty response from both Seoul and Washington on this front
mostly cast a shadow over these attempts. Their chain of thought being, the two
will not get involved in the issue of peace treaty talks that would cloud the
focus on denuclearization efforts.
Based on what has been discussed thus far,
it appears the only gain Pyongyang won from making concessions on family
reunions and its rocket launch is Liu’s visit. However,
for what it has given up, it seems to have received too little in return. Also,
given that family reunions are used as bargaining chips with Seoul and its
rocket program with the international community, it seems inappropriate to
weigh gains and losses on the same scale. Rather, we should ask the question, ‘What did Pyongyang specifically win back in return for its
concession made on family reunions?’
The question still remains unanswered. In
accordance with past practices, it should have received massive rice aid in
return or be engaged in talks to discuss what the appropriate equivalent would
be, but nothing of the sort has happened. From a long-term perspective, if the
North is in search of improving inter-Korean ties, it should have started up
the engine for cross-border dialogue, but the talks promised in the 8.25
agreement have yet to see light.
Internally, discussions are likely ongoing
about the prospects of holding these inter-Korean talks. However, it also
appears probable that Pyongyang sees no need to actively aid the South’s Park Geun Hye administration while it is bogged down in political
muck and mire brought on by domestic controversy over the issue of creating
state-published history textbooks.
More time will be needed to assess where
the North is heading, of course, but as of now, its political steps punctuated by the
events of the 8.25 agreement, putting off the rocket launch, offering talks on
signing a peace treaty, and holding family reunions without the promise of
inter-Korean dialogue seem rather messy. The lack of intricacy, if anything, signals events
with the North down the line will be fickle.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
