 Left: North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun. Right: China”s President Xi Jinping. Images: Yonhap News Agency |
Because bribery in NK has become a de facto
necessity for citizens on every rung of the social ladder, any reform aimed at
stamping out public sector misconduct will need to have serious teeth. Only
systematic, widespread, and disruptive measures stand a chance to make a
difference. In China as well, President Xi Jinping has been undertaking an
unprecedented drive to “tackle both the tigers and the flies” in order to solve
his country’s corruption problem. But when the dust settles, will Xi’s takedown
of the country’s most egregious offenders prove to be just another political
purge, or will it scare the whole upper brass into propriety? For North Korea,
the stakes are even higher. As the economy continues to expand, they’ll need to
chip away at the bedrock of corruption before it further destabilizes the
delicate balance of power between the private and public sectors.
 The Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Committee convened on Feb 23rd, 2015. Image: Yonhap News Agency |
Structural Differences in the KPA/PLA’s
Relationships with the Economy
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is
now the largest standing army in the world, with over 3 million members
distributed across five branches. Over the past two decades, the Chinese
military has modernized and expanded on a large scale. The PLA’s budget has
increased over fivefold in the past 15 years – from $27 billion in 2000 to $141
billion in 2014. But this is mostly thanks to China’s overall economic
expansion. According to NATO, China spent just 2.1% of its GDP on its armed
forces in 2013, a figure which has remained steady since 1990. China’s rising
tide has raised a number of boats, and the PLA is simply one of them. North
Korea is a different story altogether.
The DPRK’s songun (military first)
policy ensures that the regime invests a huge chunk of the budget in the armed
forces. According to the US State Department, the DPRK spends approximately $10
billion annually, or 25% of its GNP. The KPA is proportionally larger than
China’s PLA, including approximately 1.19 million troops from a population of
less than 25 million. Although all Chinese citizens are legally required to
perform military service under the constitution of the PRC, there are so many
volunteers that compulsory conscription has become unnecessary. North Korea, on
the other hand, requires all men to serve a grueling 10 year term, and
announced earlier this year that eligible women will also be required to serve
terms of between 3-6 years starting in April.
 The Korean People’s Army. Image: Yonhap News Agency |
The financial anatomy of the country’s
armed forces is significantly different. Unlike the PLA, the KPA is required to
take on private sector projects in order to fund itself. The December 7th
factory, for example, is operated by Unit 1501 and produces – among other
things – maxi pads and submarines. By having one hand in the civilian economy,
leveraging their monopolies in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and
taking advantage of a slave labor force, the KPA is able to stay afloat and
make its upper echelon officers rich. But because of massive inflation in 2002
and redenomination in 2009, most military personnel still only make about $1 to
$4 per month, with varying levels of rations available. Outside of Pyongyang,
ration distribution has largely dried up entirely. But the truth is that not
even state officials make their money through their official state salaries.
Instead, they use privileged access to construction projects, kickbacks for
appointments, and accept bribes from private partners bidding on contracts.
Thus, mid-level officers take home about $300-$500 a month. Some make much,
much more. In the last decade or so, the KPA has increasingly earned the ire of
recruits, their families, and the community. The 1990s famine, or “Arduous
March,” brought the North Korean people’s faith in their government down to an
all-time low. In light of this, the KPA’s corruption, favoritism, and brutality
has become even more difficult to swallow.
The PLA has also been in the headlines
recently for inciting antipathy among the general population. China’s growing
middle class has become fed up with seeing stories of how the super-rich
manipulate, bribe, and bully their way to the top, often to the detriment of
the public good. Furthermore, China’s executive branch is contending that the
PLA’s corrupt officers gum up the command chain with graft and misuse. After
witnessing America’s high tech army sustain minimal casualties while launching
devastating attacks in Iraq circa 1990, the Chinese brass realized just how
outdated their massive but ineffective cold war era army had become. The PLA
thereafter began a radical transition predicated on one main aspiration: become
a fighting force worthy of the world’s number two superpower.
They hope to do
this by ridding waste, eroding the culture of corruption, and updating
technologically. At the Academy of Military Science in Beijing, researchers
began dissecting the US’s “revolution in military affairs,” particularly
focusing on the way computers were used to increase efficiency by re-aligning
command structures. Through this, it must have become clear that the nepotism
and patronage networks of the PLA’s golden old days would need to be replaced
by squeaky clean cogs connecting together to form a seamless machine. Xi
Jinping’s aggressive witch hunting and desire to trim the fat from China’s
military have led to a different culture among commanding officers.
 China’s new military. Image: Yonhap News Agency |
Corruption of the Chinese variety is a
white glove affair, consisting mostly of promotion kickbacks and graft in the
logistics department. Xinhua reported that 90% of corruption cases in China
involved rear area personal, not commanding officers. US Army Lt. Colonel
Dennis Blasko told Business Insider that very few operational commanders “have
been caught in the corruption dragnet.” Furthermore, many analysts predict that
though a crackdown on corruption in China may destabilize some functional
arrangements and put a hit on the luxury goods industry, it would substantially
improve cash flows within the economy and improve the PLA’s fighting capacity
in the long term. The major stakeholders in the KPA, on the other hand, have
become dependent on their illicit connections to the marketplace, without which
they would undoubtedly drown.
The KPA’s role in the larger economy is likewise
pivotal, and though the majority of the population loses out because the
military has a number of industries under its thumb, engages in systemic
corruption, and exploits its 1 million man plus labor source, the system’s
winners are far too well connected, invested, and afraid to see the house of
cards come crumbling down to invite change willingly.
It can’t be argued, however, that the KPA’s
relationship with the Workers’ Party in the DPRK doesn’t bear some resemblances
to the power sharing relationship between the executive and military branches
in China. And while many analysts are having trouble deciphering whether Xi
Jinping’s current initiatives are a political purge or a genuine clean up, it’s
hard to ignore the headlines that keep streaming out of Beijing. The latest
reports from the BBC’s Carrie Gracie indicate that “Wang Qishan, right hand man
to the president and head of the Communist Party’s corruption watchdog, is
planning to go ‘fox hunting’” abroad. This means traveling to the United States,
Australia, Canada, and France to track down wayward corrupt officials in order
to haul them back to Beijing for trial and sentencing. 10 years ago, who would
have predicted that anti-corruption measures of this scale would be possible in
China? Ten years from now, will they say the same about North Korea?
To be continued…
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
