Choe Ryong Hae, a secretary of the Chosun Workers’ Party, visited Russia as a special
envoy of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Eun for a one-week trip starting
November 17th. Choe made a trip to China in May 2013 with the same purpose.
Unlike his previous visit to China, he reportedly came back from Russia with
substantial gains. Still, prospects for the regime are far from bright–the
news served mostly as a reminder of how severely isolated the country is at the
moment. Kim Jong Eun’s decision to dispatch Choe Ryong Hae to Russia can be
understood in three contexts.
First, North Korea is seeking to tackle its
isolation in the international community. China’s tougher stance against North
Korea, combined with international sanctions, has driven the country into a
corner. Against this backdrop, North Korea is trying to find an ally that it
can turn to. Pyongyang is desperate to demonstrate to the international
community, namely China, South Korea and the U.S., that “it still has a
friend.” The U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee was voting on the North
Korean human rights resolution circa Choe Ryong Hae’s meeting with
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The voting results came out in the early
hours of November 19 [KST]; surely, Choe Ryong Hae asked for Putin’s support
regarding the U.N. resolution before the outcome’s announcement–which revealed, unsurprisingly, Russia was opposed to this resolution. This sequence of events
is the most plausible and widely accepted.
Second, the recent move to send a special
envoy to Russia is seen as an attempt to strengthen its stance against the
United States. Russia faces international sanctions over the Ukraine conflict
that erupted in March 2014. Moreover, the country has remained clearly at odds
with the U.S. over the July crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. Russia is
strengthening ties with China to counterbalance U.S. influence in Asia.
North Korea’s attempts to foster closer relations with Russia, also
beleaguered by U.S.-imposed sanctions, are aimed at promoting national
cohesion– undermined by rumors about Kim Jong Eun’s health– as well as
toughening its stance against the U.S. It is also likely that North Korea seeks
to elicit a response from the U.S. government, which has offered no quid pro quo for the recent release of three American
citizens who had been detained in the North.
Third, North Korea may seek to discuss
nuclear issues with Russia, whose conciliatory approach contrasts with China’s
pressure to denuclearize. According to Global Times, a daily Chinese tabloid,
Russia’s Foreign Ministry told ITAR-TASS, a Russian news agency, “North Korean
Special Envoy Choe Ryong Hae will discuss Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program
with high-ranking Russian officials.” The comments suggest North Korea is
likely to have asked for Russian support for recognition as a nuclear-armed
state and discussed measures for resumption of the six-party talks without any
preconditions.
In short, Choe Ryong Hae’s recent trip to
Russia was most likely intended to breakthrough North Korea’s international isolation,
while expressing some degree of direct protest against the U.S. The visit also
serves as tacit confirmation of Pyongyang’s determination to continue
development of nuclear weapons, and that it has no plans to beg for improvement
of inter-Korean relations to realize economic cooperation.
As a result, North Korea may take further
provocative actions against South Korea. Since the Third Committee of the U.N.
General Assembly passed a resolution on human rights in North Korea, the regime
has hinted at the possibility of a fourth nuclear test and even issued explicit
threats to the South Korean government. Kim Jong Eun, during a recent visit to
Sinchon Museum in South Hwanghae Province, declared that “having an illusion
about the enemy means death,” meant to foster hostile feelings toward South
Korea and the U.S. among residents of North Korea. However, the author believes his words
to have stronger implications for the people of South Korea.
This month, after an expected pass by the
U.N. General Assembly, the draft resolution on human rights conditions in North
Korea will be discussed and voted on by the U.N. Security Council. Additionally,
the third anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death is coming up on December 17th,
followed by Kim Jong Eun’s birthday on January 8th. While these events are
predictable, it will be much harder to anticipate Pyongyang’s next move. We
must stay alert to any North Korean provocation not only at the end of this
year, but as we head into the next. Maintaining illusions about North Korea without
clearly understanding its core could bring us misery and ruin.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
