For a long time, East Germans did not think
unification was possible, not merely because it seemed unlikely for as long as
the Soviet Union continued to exert its influence, but also because there was limited
public space for discussion of unification during the construction of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or GDR.
Besides which, just as in West Germany, plenty of
intellectuals instinctively favored a divided Germany for the sake of Germans,
Europe, and the world.
And yet, once the Soviet Union had turned its
back on the East German communist government in October 1989 and the West
German leadership demonstrated that it was willing to reunite, the people of the East didn’t
hesitate to opt for it.
Attitudes before the Peaceful revolution
Pre-revolution
East German support for unification can be indirectly gleaned from views of socialism itself. To the 1975 question, “Will socialism be achieved
worldwide?” 63% of respondents answered “Definitely” and just 9% said “Impossible.”
Yet by 1988, support for “Definitely” had fallen to less than 10% while 60-70% were
sure it was “Impossible.” In
the 1975 survey, 46% of respondents expressed agreement with the tenets of
Marxism-Leninism, while just 14% said they did not. However, by October 1989, just
6% said they agreed while 62% did not.
Meanwhile, a public opinion poll on national consciousness taken in 1985 showed that
68% of East Germans aged 14 to 29 said they considered the two German states to
be “one nation,” while 32% responded otherwise. 76% said they wanted
unification and just 13% said they did not, with 11% expressing indifference.
However, the problem was that another survey done in the same year about the possibility of
unification actually taking place found that an absolute majority, 60%, of young
people thought it was impossible, while just 4% thought it was feasible.
This shows that while
East Germans yearned for the West German system, they didn’t think unification
was probable. When West German Prime Minister Willy Brandt was enthusiastically greeted
in East Germany in March 1970, the reaction was widely interpreted as a request
for negotiations that could result in greater trade and exchange volumes, not a call for
unification.
Attitudes during the Peaceful Revolution
Monday night candlelight vigils started at
a church in Leipzig in September 1989, and slowly began to spread nationwide. On October 18th,
leader Erich Honecker was removed by his Politburo, and the protests grew
louder still. But the demands of East German citizens were for reform, not revolution.
However, the desire for unification grew, and on November 22nd the slogan “We are one nation” appeared at one of the Leipzig
protests for the first time. A month later, when West German Prime Minister Helmut
Kohl visited Dresden on December 19th and declared his goal to be
unification, he was enthusiastically applauded and, with this as momentum, aggravation
at the actions of the communist regime began to turn into real energy for
unification. The impact was reflected in public opinion polling data. In a
survey conducted in September 1989, 52%
of people had said they opposed unification, but by January 1990,
pro-unification opinion was well in the ascendant.
But
nevertheless, right up until East Germany’s first, and only, democratic
election in March 1990, there was little public passion for “rapid
reunification.” In two separate opinion polls, the first in December 1989 and again
in February 1990, the Social Democratic Party, running on a platform of phased
unification, got 53% support, while the Alliance for Germany, which sought rapid unity, got just 24%.
However, it
was the latter with its promise of rapid unification that won the March 18th
election with 48.1% of the vote, while the former with its phased unification pledge
came second with just 21.9%. The result was seen as a reflection of many elements: public
desire for the affluence of West Germany, disappointment at the record of reformers in East Germany, fears over East Germany’s rapidly declining economy, Prime
Minister Kohl’s statement that a percentage of East German money was convertible at 1:1, and lingering fears of Soviet retrenchment and possible intervention. It also indicated the possibility that people had not answered honestly to the opinion pollsters, and also deliberate manipulation of the opinion polling data.
* Opinions expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. This is an abridged translation of a column that appeared in Korean on June 19th.
