Only one year ago, North Korea was
threatening the South with war. In fact, the North became so aggressive
following its third, February 12th nuclear test that it would not be much of an
exaggeration to say that war had already begun.
Since then, things have quietened down on
the nuclear front. But while closed-door negotiations have taken place between
the United States and China on the subject of restarting the Six-Party Talks,
tangible results have not emerged. The question is what do the United States
and South Korea hope to achieve? Can they effectively pursue a dual strategy of
dialogue and pressure?
Last August, South Korea’s Minister of
Unification and executor of the Park administration’s “Peninsula trust-building
process,” Ryoo Kihl Jae explicitly stated the South Korean government’s current
policy: “Effectively balancing methods of dialogue and pressure.” This was
followed by a comment from Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung Se in March:
“We will continue to pursue principled dialogue toward denuclearization, while
at the same time applying effective pressure to bring about a decision from the
North Korean leadership.” Minister Yun added that sanctions initiated against
the North by the UN Security Council are “effective.”
Is this really the nature of their
strategy? If so, why is there this feeling of emptiness behind the confident
tone of the ministerial staff? Just how effective are UNSC sanctions against
the North? Are they in line with the United States’ supposed push for
denuclearization? Could it perhaps be the case that the “strategic patience” of
the United States has morphed into “strategic ignorance” or “deliberate
neglect?”
At some point, the terms “carrot” and
“stick” became the rather more refined “dialogue” and “pressure.” Of course,
there is little discernible difference, as the end results, “inducement” and
“coercion,” remain the same. The provision of an alternative energy supply, carrot,
and a coercive block on supplies of equipment and fuel, stick, constitute the
two core policy tracks underpinning the international denuclearization regime,
and always have.
However, North Korea has not changed its
stance, and now we are faced with a situation whereby it is possible for the
regime to build nuclear weapons, albeit at a rudimentary level. Within North
Korea itself there are mixed assessments about the regime’s nuclear capacity,
but the Worker’s Party has little choice but to bend to the will of the
military.
Then, what are the conditions and drivers
necessary for the proper implementation of “dialogue and pressure?” The central
point is that there has to be something to gain from dialogue and something to
lose due to pressure. The existence of this “something”
is key to the success of the policy. Therefore, there must also be agreement on
what this “something” is. If the North has nothing to lose or gain either way,
there is no need for them to respond to measures pushing for abandonment of
their nuclear weapons.
At present, sanctions are the primary
measure used to pressure North Korea. Are they being effectively implemented? Recent
reports suggest Kim Jung Eun spent more than $645 million on luxury goods in
2012 alone. The exact amount he wasted is not particularly relevant; what
matters is that he had such an exorbitant sum on hand simply to maintain the
loyalty of those around him.
Was a transaction of this magnitude possible
via legal channels? Transactions such as these require hard currency. Would it
have been possible if financial sanctions were properly in place? Could the
North really have accumulated such enormous cash reserves in this way?
From an ordinary person’s perspective,
ministerial assurances of the effectiveness of economic sanctions are
perplexing. Doubts arise from pure common sense, and don’t even require
evidence from expert analysis or baseline data. Only when the government persuasively
assuages those doubts will trust in their policy grow of its own accord.
The North’s ability to purchase $645
million of luxury goods points to one of two possibilities. The first is that
the North’s extreme isolation renders economic blockades ineffective, and that reserves
in foreign bank accounts are enough to keep the regime afloat. The second is
that sanctions put in place by the international community are not effective.
Perhaps both are correct. Regardless, the
current situation ought to be viewed through a realist lens. Hitherto, many
scholars have diagnosed the North Korea sickness with idealist or
constructivist lenses; however, these approaches only explore teleological arguments,
and view the justification for nuclear weapons from the perspective of the
North Korean regime.
The government’s current policy is no
different. They appear to expect that mere pressure will compel the North to
rejoin the Six-Party Talks. Is the South seriously considering ratcheting up
the pressure to such a level that the only way for the North to survive is by
giving up nuclear arms of their own accord?
Rather than imagining out this scenario, it
would be wise for the government to establish an inventory of bullet points. We
don’t need general concepts like “dialogue” and “pressure.” Serious thought
must be given to what the South is willing to give and what it wishes to take,
and what value system to adhere to when it comes to dealing with the North. We
cannot trust that the individuals and agencies in charge of the security of the
nation have done so thus far.
* This is an abridged version of a column
that appeared on Daily NK in Korean on March 17th. Opinions expressed in Guest
Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
