North Korea successfully tested their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ‘Unha-3.’
Information saying that North Korea has been developing an ICBM that can reach the west coast of the U.S. has been around for years. This is not in the least bit surprising. We have just been in oblivion, that’s all.
It was around July 2004 when the chairman of the Committee for Democratization of North Korea, Hwang Jang Yop, gave a lecture on “the solution to North Korean issues.” He had been invited by lawmaker Kwon Young Sae of what was then the Grand National Party.
Hwang’s theory was that North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the Kim Jong Il regime both stemmed from the same context, meaning that the problem couldn’t be solved by focusing on nuclear weapons; the only way it could be solved was to get rid of North Korea’s absolutist system in its entirety. “Fighting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons is not like playing with fire; it is playing with the shadow of the fire,” he said.
Hwang explained that North Korea was developing ICBMs which can reach the western United States. However, no one believed him. The South Korean government and mass media did not feel the weight of the testimony that Hwang gave on North Korea’s nuclear strategy. Why did that happen? Because the domestic situation of the time allowed it to happen.
The Roh Moo Hyun administration of the day thought North Korea’s nuclear strategy was one designed to lead to talks with the U.S. Some experts continue to believe this, in fact. That is why former President Roh said when he returned from the U.S., “There is a point to North Korea’s nuclear development.”
It was in that mood that Hwang’s testimony, whereby “North Korea is developing an ICBM which can reach the western U.S.,” was not accepted, and the whole thing came to be seen as a battle over North Korea policy between conservatives and progressives. However, it is actually very important information for the South Korean government, information that has nothing to do with the ideological approach of a conservative or a progressive.
Sometimes the truth is not accepted as the truth, and this is certainly true when the subject is North Korea. When we talk “facts” about North Korean issues, people hearing those “facts” immediately make a conservative or progressive issue of them. There are North Korea experts who like to call Hwang Jang Yop an extreme conservative. There are countless cases, in fact. The reality is that people here judge blindly, many doing so without knowing what being extreme right or left even means.
This writer feels that it is very important to inform people of “the whole truth” about problems in North Korea, and then look for a solution from there. It takes time, but there is no other way. Then, if we look at the late Hwang’s testimony, what is the key content? There are two main points.
First, in late summer of 1996 when Party Munitions Industry Secretary Jeon Byung Ho appeared at a Party Central Committee meeting for the first time in ages, then-International Secretary Hwang asked him “Where have you been?” and Jeon replied, “Now you don’t need to go to the trouble of buying plutonium when you go abroad. I went to Pakistan and signed an agreement where we give them missile technology in exchange for their uranium centrifuges.”
Second, Jeon also said, “The ICBM we are working on can get to the west coast of the United States. However, we cannot be sure where it will fall. Even if we are aiming to hit LA it could fall elsewhere. But, anyway, we can hit the west coast.”
So, Jeon’s words tell us the following: 1) North Korea started developing an uranium enrichment program in 1996, although they did not admit it until James Kelly was told in 2002; and 2) the ICBM technology tested on Wednesday in the form of ‘Unha-3’ was already substantively advanced way back in 1996.
Even if the whole thing began in 1996, that was still 16 years ago. Sixteen years ago, North Korea had already made progress on an ICBM which could reach the western U.S. Therefore, we shouldn’t be so surprised by the Unha-3 that appeared on the front page of all major newspapers.
What we should be surprised by are the politicians who still do not believe the truth about North Korean issues, and the ignorance of some so-called experts. The success of Unha-3 should not be surprising, but the ‘ignorance’ inside us all certainly should.
Hwang passed away in October 2010, following ten years during which all I ever heard from him was that “the South Korean government does not believe us!” or that “these ignorant experts are giving me a headache.” “When I was in North Korea I was bothered by the ‘extraordinary genius’ of Kim Jong Il,” he said. “But I also have a headache now because there are too many geniuses.”
Those young experts who boasted like they knew everything were in control of policy toward North Korea during the Kim-Roh era, and there are a few in the Lee administration now, and a few more here and there in the presidential camps.
In 1997 when Hwang defected he stated clearly, “North Korea is already holding plutonium nuclear weapons and plans to make more of them.” He also mentioned ICBMs. However, ‘experts’ did not want to believe him. They said that North Koreans were not capable of such things. Even though they were always getting kicked sideways by North Korean strategy against South Korea, they still managed to take North Korea lightly.
These ‘experts’ tend to focus on the stars when I am pointing at the moon. Some do not even look in the direction in which I’m pointing, preferring to criticize the dirt under my nails. They do not get the gist of things. People stand around and chat loudly about how right they are. They only believe what they want to believe and only view the information they want to see. People stuck in their own beliefs are not a help to this country. How can the Republic of Korea move forward in this kind of atmosphere?
If you want to know exactly what North Korea is and what it is doing, read Hwang’s books. The way to solve the North Korea problem is also already there.
The problem is not that there isn’t enough information out there about North Korea’s nuclear strategy, but that the people implementing our strategy haven’t read those books. The source of all problems is within us, you see, but people prefer to blame their ignorance on a lack of information.
Although the Unha-3 experimental missile was launched during the Kim Jong Eun era, it is an extension of Kim Jong Il’s last instructions, and was launched according to Kim Jong Il’s own nuclear strategy. In November of 2010, North Korea invited U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker to review their enriched uranium facilities, and the recent success of Unha-3 shows they have completed the second step of the same strategy.
The last two steps are re-entry and miniaturization. Using highly enriched uranium in a third nuclear test could reveal that North Korea knows basically how to miniaturize nuclear warheads. We do not know whether they already have re-entry technology and just haven’t attempted it. It is difficult to establish whether they have learned the skill or not.
But there is some evidence. I heard from Hwang that Professor Seo Sang Kuk of Kim Il Sung University provided the mathematical theory for North Korea’s weapons program. He graduated from university in Moscow and is known to be a mathematical genius. Apparently, in 1980 Seo participated in a communist bloc defense technology competition in Hungary, and while other participants proved their points through tests, Seo proved his by writing a board full of mathematical formulae, amazing the audience.
We should expect North Korea, which has used all its resources in developing nuclear weapons and missile, to be ahead of South Korea. In any case, the key to security is to prepare for the worst.
What is the end purpose of Kim Jong Il’s nuclear strategy? It is very clear. They are hoping to break the ROK-U.S. military alliance after agreeing a Korean Peninsula peace treaty with the U.S., maintaining military superiority on the Peninsula and receiving stable economic support from South Korea. South Korea will become a nuclear hostage state and the pro-North factions in South Korea will join with North and go forth to unification under the North Korean regime. Whether this is possible or impossible, that is their aim. It is the reason for the existence of the North Korean regime.
Then what should we do?
North Korea’s nuclear strategy is not an overnight occurrence. There is no silver bullet. If North Korea does well then they must be given bread, and if not they must be punished in cooperation with the international community. It is fair to punish North Korea when they fire off missiles.
The government and private sectors must precisely understand Kim Jong Il’s nuclear strategy. We must no longer say that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a tool in negotiations or an unimportant triviality.
And most important of all, the people and government should share a similar goal in seeking to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. For as long as totalitarian dictatorship does not go away, the problem will continue to expand.
The big problem is that we don’t have much time. The North Korea problem should be solved within the next five years. That is the only way we can give hope to the young, and most importantly it is the only future for the 80 million people living on this peninsula.
* The viewpoints expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.
