Since President Park Geun Hye made her “Dresden
Declaration” in late March, the Kim Jong Eun regime has poured nothing but criticism down
upon her. With Pyongyang making strategic hay out of the Sewol ferry sinking to try
and incite internecine conflict and shake the foundations of the Park
government, inter-Korea relations seem a long way from improving.
Nevertheless,
though a new committee designed to prepare for unification hasn’t yet really gotten
moving, the South Korean government has been stoic in its approach, and broadly
in line with the content of the Dresden Declaration.
At the end
of May, Daily NK met with new Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)
director Choi Jin Wook, who took up the role in March, to hear about the
situation Kim Jong Eun is in today and possible ways forward for unification.
Following hard on the heels of threatening a
fourth nuclear test, North Korea has recently been highly critical of the South
Korean government over the Sewol ferry tragedy. What do you think is the
intention behind it all?
Just as
they did with all those nuclear threats in April, the North has been using the
Sewol ferry tragedy to attack the South at a time when it is unsettled. It looks
as if they are seeking to acquire a card that can be played to get what they
want in the event that the attack succeeds. This is the North’s traditional strategy
of shaking up the South Korean government by casting inter-Korean relations
into crisis while, at the same time, saying they will participate in the
Incheon Asian Games and making conciliatory gestures to non-governmental
organizations.
Then how should South Korea deal with this?
President
Park’s policy toward North Korea is not to give North Korea the inter-Korean
relationship it wants, but to forge inter-Korean relations based on common
sense and logic. Some say we should accept what the North wants to some degree
in order to make relations better, but it is important to follow the
logical principle so as to avoid sending the wrong signal to the North. Park’s
Dresden Declaration offers the way to better inter-Korean relations as well as
Korean unification.
What do you think of the argument that the
government needs to withdraw the May 24th Measures [sanctions
imposed following the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010] in order to realize the Dresden
Declaration?
That is one
part of the Dresden Declaration that North Korea is failing to understand. If
the North thinks that way, it must come to the table for dialogue. But what
they are doing is just criticizing, which is wrong. Frankly, if [we thought
that] cancellation of the May 24th Measures would have a big
influence on improving relations, then we might do it. But the argument that withdrawing
them could help improve inter-Korean relation does not make any sense.
Do you think Kim Jong Eun is willing to bring
about economic reform?
Not
economic reform per se, but his wish for (economic) revitalization seems clear.
However, though he is interested in attracting foreign capital, he isn’t putting
any effort into improving inter-Korean relations. This is a bad move, because relations
between North and South are a major factor for any third country making the
decision to invest in North Korea.
It is
unimaginable that the North could attract sufficient foreign investment and
assistance without considering inter-Korean relations. Kim cannot see this
practical difficulty, however, and so no matter how much he may wish for
economic improvement, the likelihood of failure remains very high.
Some say the regime has made a soft landing
since the execution of Jang Sung Taek [in December 2013]. But all this criticism
toward President Park suggests otherwise. What is your view?
The instability
has gotten worse, not only economically but also politically. Without a “control
tower” after the execution of Jang, the possibility of a consecutive power
struggles is high. And from the North’s criticism of the outside, what we can see is its desire for
internal unity. Earlier this year, the North seemed to want to improve
inter-Korean relations, but later stopped that as it adjudged that South Korean
assistance could harm internal cohesion. That is the dilemma North Korea is
facing at this moment.
Is there much chance of a sudden change in
North Korea, then?
Rather than
measuring the possibility of sudden change, we must simply confirm whether the
possibility exists or not. When you are having a fire drill, you don’t measure
whether the possibility of fire is 1% or 99% and act accordingly. We need to postulate
the simple possibility of the North suddenly changing, and get prepared for it.
