 Former KINU director Kim Tae Woo | Image: Daily NK |
On March 28th, President Park Geun Hye gave a
speech about Korean Peninsula peace and unity in Dresden, a German city
that symbolizes that country’s experience of unification. No sooner had President Park finished talking, however, than the North
Korean authorities began to employ civilian interviews and televised “expert discussion” to
heavily criticize the speech. This exemplified the fact that, for the time being at least, there is no obvious path to the kind of humanitarian and infrastructure assistance that President Park
attempted to put on the inter-Korean table.
Indeed, Pyongyang has since gone in the opposite direction. They warned of a “new type” of nuclear test on the 30th and conducted unusual military
exercises in the contested West Sea area on the 31st. Then, early in
April, Kim Jong Eun gave a speech on the rising threat level on the Korean
Peninsula.
These actions paint a picture of the goals of the Kim regime, one that suggests conflicting objectives. While attacking “biased” international
cooperation on the North Korean nuclear program, the North Korean authorities
are trying to instigate a change in international policy toward it, all while maintaining systemic
cohesion at home.
The Kim regime describes regime change as Seoul’s priority policy goal, and reacts sensitively in accordance with this stance. In such circumstances, creating opportunities to pull the North
Korean system in the direction of change whilst opening up avenues to improve
human rights in the country is a profoundly challenging task.
As a former director of the Korea Institute for National
Unification, Dr. Kim Tae Woo has spent many years considering and speaking on
this matter, and, on April 2nd, he spoke with Daily NK.
According to
Dr. Kim, human rights are no more and no less than North Korea’s “Achilles
Heel;” in other words, the thing that may make the reform, opening, and denuclearization of North Korea
possible.
Mirroring President Park’s “unification jackpot” comment,
Kim emphasized, “Unification would be a ‘human rights jackpot’ to the North
Korean people; it would mean liberation from tyranny and destitution. As such, human
rights are the start point that can offer a way into the North Korea problem, and
unification would be the conclusion of that problem.”
“If [the Kim Jong Eun regime] wants a soft landing, they
must gradually change. They must pursue reform and opening, and improve the
people’s standard of living; simultaneously, they will have to get outside help
from South Korea and others,” he went on. “However, because they perceive that even the
smallest change could come back to threaten their regime and system, they remain
firmly attached to nuclear arms even though the isolation and destitution [that they bring] is visible.”
Given the scale of the problem, Kim’s attention
was bound to turn to the North Korea Human Rights Act, which has now been
stalled in the South Korean legislature for a decade. “Many countries have
passed similar acts, and countless human rights groups and NGOs have expressed
their concern [over human rights in North Korea]; yet, South Korea has been
unable to pass the North Korea Human Rights Act,” he lamented. “We must
actively intervene in these issues, and make our voices heard: on the political prison camps; on
the [Korean War] POWs; on the abductees; and on the food insecurity of the young and vulnerable.”
South Korea has spent many years discussing matters
pertaining to North Korea, yet without arriving at any meaningful consensus on
the process, content, or value of unification, he said critically. There have been no practical
preparations made for unification, and no agreement on if, when, or how to link the nuclear issue
with unification itself. As such, and unlike some other experts, Kim does see potential in the Park administration’s “Unification Preparatory Committee.” However, “Rather than just exchanging pleasantries, it needs to generate public and political consensus on these critical agenda items.”
“The committee must discuss detailed strategies for
unification, rather than engaging in simple, superficial dialogue,” he went
on. “It is important to run it in such a way that it plays a distinct role, and does not end up simply duplicating the work of existing
entities such as the Ministry of Unification and National Intelligence
Service.”
“If the Unification Preparatory Committee is to be a grouping that prepares sincerely for unification, then it must be capable of devising strategies for North Korean change,” he concluded.
