President Park Geun Hye’s first address of the New Year saw unification
likened to a “jackpot.” Her comments
have since been followed by an announcement of the formation of a new committee
tasked with preparing for eventual unification of the peninsula. Opinion is divided over what lies behind the
decision; does the current administration intend to create a blueprint for a
unified peninsula, or is this a reflection of less than adequate unification
preparation up until this point?
Last year alone, Kim Jong Eun green-lighted the North’s
third nuclear test and the unilateral shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The regime’s current peace offensive is evidence
of the “rugby ball strategy” of the regime, designed to
ensure that the South is never entirely sure of Pyongyang’s intentions. Such unpredictability
only heightens the need for the formation of comprehensive policy to see the
Korean Peninsula unified under a system of liberal democracy.
To learn more about the current administration’s latest move
to tackle the complexities of unification, Daily NK spoke with Myongji
University’s resident expert on German reunification, Prof. Park Sang Bong.
The North Korean regime is putting great effort into
internal stability at the same time as sending constant messages of conciliation
toward the South. What is behind such moves?
Kim Jong Eun’s rugby ball approach disproves the argument
that the North Korean regime is insecure. Their conciliatory attitude of late is part of
an effort to obtain foreign currency that they can use to maintain the regime. After all, they had a taste of such sweeteners
from the Sunshine Policy. The North also
hopes to stoke conflict within the South by utilizing the power of North Korea’s
secret friends, the pro-North elements in South Korea.
Some are predicting
that Kim Jong Eun will use the upcoming elections for the Supreme People’s Assembly
to wind up the purge of the Jang Sung Taek line and oversee significant personnel
changes in order to solidify his power.
Everyone likes to point out that North Korea is already a collapsed
state. Some experts even go as far as to say that North Korea is a “zombie
nation” that has now expired. Kim Jong Eun has increased imports of luxury items
even more than his predecessors Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and is using “gift
politics” to maintain his own regime. If he makes even a slight mistake, however,
this may well serve to expedite regime collapse. Just as we saw in the purge of Jang
Sung Taek, the regime is weakening, and it grows ever likely that when cracks start
to appear, anti-Kim Jong Eun elements that are well aware of the corrupt nature
of the system will come to the fore.
Calls are growing for research on unification measures
to prepare the South for any sudden change scenario. How should such measures progress?
The reason why Kim Jong Eun has been unable to stabilize his
regime is that he know’s there is no possible way for it to develop. Accordingly, Kim Jong Eun may wish to enact Vietnam-
style unification by way of North-South exchanges. Kim Jong Eun knows that
Vietnam-style unification under communism is the only way for North Korea to
avoid its own downfall and survive. He
has been engaging in a “dialogue offensive” in order to maintain the
regime. We should not overlook these
facts, and we must now prepare for a situation of sudden change brought about
by internal unrest in the North. Similarly, through various measures to see reform
and development, we must move forward with sincere motions to improve inter-Korean
relations.
South Korea and
Germany are very different. Can South Korea
learn anything from the German experience?
It is not being argued that Korea adopt a unification policy
identical to that of Germany. However,
there is one aspect of German unification that would be essential for Korea. That is, peaceful unification is achieved on a foundation of liberal democracy and market economics. While it remains possible to engage with Kim
Jong Eun when it comes to North-South exchanges or the issue of separated
family reunions, we must not engage with him on the matter of unification. We
must proceed with our own preparations.
What problems exist in South Korea’s current unification
measures? What could be done to improve these?
If referring to unification as a “jackpot” alludes to the
benefits that South Korea would gain from unifying with the North under liberal democracy, then such measures are highly meaningful. However, as this
still remains unclear, I believe it still too early to tell. Measures that work
toward getting North Korea onto a path of reform and opening must be core in
the government’s preparation for eventual unification. Also, it must be made
clear that discussing unification with North Korea’s hereditary dictatorship cannot
happen. We must create policy on the
assumption that any discussion of unification can only occur with a regime that
genuinely represents the country.
The plan for unification seems insufficient as it stands. There are now calls for unification leadership,
and unification policy that properly grasps the nature of the regime.
The problem to be overcome before we can see genuine democratic
unification between the two Korea is the so-called South-South conflict. In a situation where the forces that stand by former
lawmaker Lee Seok Ki and his “rebellion” and North Korea’s
sinking of the Cheonan continue to exist, there will always be opposition
against any genuine discussion of unification. To instill democratic
consciousness within North Korean society, which cannot be done merely through
exchanges and cooperation, we
must continually research to what extent we can create strategies that will see the mistaken hereditary dictatorship change into a democratic government.
Other voices are saying that need to find unification leadership
that can accurately grasp the North Korean regime and manage changes in situation and strategy
formation capable of utilizing the power of the elite and the military.
When Germany reunified, when those West Germans who had
worked for the Eastern government were judged, they were judged not on West German
standards but by East German law. On
this point, Korean unification too must not set out to punish North Korean core
powerbrokers on the pretext of reconstructing the North. It is necessary
right now to establish a viewpoint on the best way to assess the factors that
would come into play after unification.
As unification is
being prepared for, there are suggestions as to the need for tactical strategies that
would see the spread of ‘a liberal democratic consciousness among the North
Korean people.
We must view as important the fact that information is being
exchanged through North Korea’s markets, not just physical goods. As such, we must design measures to use the
market to spread the consciousness of liberal democracy. Also, we must demand greater
cooperation from the North Korea authorities, and must
also consistently demand that we allow more than just
the elite groups that the authorities chose to take part, but for regular citizens to
be able to come and go freely.
One cannot overlook
how much the Koreas will be able to persuade and cooperate with neighboring
countries, since they will be there during unification, too.
Firstly, if China opposes Korea’s unification at the same
time as the ROK-U.S. alliance holds firm, then there is the need for strong talk
that this will not be overlooked. Also, if the peninsula achieves unification under a free market economy, North Korea will see an economic boom. We must persuade China by saying
that there could be huge room for development in the East Asian sphere through
such political stability. While clarifying to the outside world that issues
stemming from the North like the accommodation of defectors will be the responsibility
of South Korea, and that we have the confidence to develop, we must also continually emphasize our will toward unification.
