The North Korean Limits to Chinese Growth

Since the year 2000, the limitations and weaknesses which underlie China’s policy towards North Korea have gradually become evident.

First, North Korea’s reckless domestic and foreign policies, starving its citizens while threatening surrounding countries with nuclear weapons and missiles, have become a handicap to China’s own progress and its attempts to improve its position in the international community.

Due to China’s close relationship with North Korea, if the Kim Jong Il regime threatens surrounding countries with nuclear weapons and missiles, then there is the possibility of Beijing being held partly responsible.

When Kim Jong Il launches missiles and carries out nuclear tests, other countries demand that China persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, and if the North fails to return to the Six-Party Talks in the near future, then international society will expect China to put pressure on them to make it happen. Overall, the nuclear policy of the Kim Jong Il regime tends to preclude China from reaping any gains, and if Kim Jong Il continues to behave recklessly, then the resistance of surrounding countries can only increase, which will burden China yet further.

At the cost of starving its citizens, the Kim Jong Il regime has repeatedly ignored the United Nations and international society and carried out nuclear tests and missile launches. As a result, the resistance of international society has grown even stronger. China, which declares its commitment to world peace and security on the Korean peninsula, is no longer able to simply ignore North Korea’s repeated militaristic threats. As a result, intellectuals, party officials and state bureaucrats in China are now openly criticizing Kim Jong Il.

Kim Jong Il’s nuclear policy has the twin capacity to raise and lower Chinese prestige. However, with the passage of time, the latter capacity has become by far the greater. Another factor which cannot be passed over is that, in the passage of time, if specific progress towards resolving the North Korean nuclear issue does not become evident, then international society will inevitably begin to doubt China’s desire, and ability, to resolve the nuclear issue at all. This would put a serious dent in China’s international standing.

Second, the North’s actions have become a handicap to securing the international cooperation which is critical to maintaining China’s economic progress.

Currently, the biggest interest of China is economic gains. China’s goal is to catch the U.S. in terms of its total output through constant economic growth. Within 20 to 30 years of achieving that goal, China hopes to be able to surpass the U.S. in terms of its per capita output. However, in order to achieve such an outwardly focused strategy, what China inevitably needs is economic integration with international society. Chinese per capita income has yet to exceed $10,000.

While Beijing’s North Korea policy has not made a dent in economic growth to date, it is not possible for China to become a strong nation that can catch up with the U.S. if it maintains an external policy of supporting a repressive regime which threatens the people and international society.

Few liberal democracies will sit idly by while a country which has a backward foreign policy based on propping up a totalitarian dictatorship becomes a first-class economic power. If China continues to support the Kim Jong Il regime outright, then it is feasible that global economic powers might eventually seek to regulate the speed of their economic cooperation with China.

Another issue in China’s North Korea policy and its dependence on reciprocal relationships for economic growth is that at the slightest slip China itself could be dragged into battle. If Kim Jong Il ignores Chinese demands and does not stop threatening surrounding countries, then there is no guarantee against a worst-case scenario unfolding on the Korean peninsula. In such a case, the possibility of China getting embroiled in a war cannot be ignored, in which case China’s foreign policy will be critically harmed. If China does not change the basis of its current North Korea policy, then there is the possibility of such a situation becoming reality at any time.

Third, the future of the Kim Jong Il regime and the succession, which is supported by China, has become unclear. The Kim Jong Il regime does not have a clear plan through which to feed its citizens. At this rate, it will be extremely difficult to preserve the North Korean political system or the Kim Jong Il regime. North Korea has missed the chance to normalize relations with the U.S. and South Korea, since Kim Jong Il, by breaking his promises to international society repeatedly and without hesitation, has completely lost the confidence of every country with the spare capacity to assist it.

Most of all, Kim is approaching 70 and his health is deteriorating significantly. There is not much time left for the Kim Jong Il regime. For now, it seems likely that one of his sons will replace him, but even if this is the case, the future of the regime remains unclear. In contrast with Kim Jong Il, who at least has the ability to maintain absolute power, his sons have not shown the delicate capacity to follow suit. Even if the succession is nominally successful, it will be difficult to maintain a dictatorial regime which is on the brink of collapse almost constantly. With the contradiction between the intent of the Kim Jong Il regime to preserve the dictatorship and the demands of the North Korean citizens, who want to lead better lives, the future of the North Korean regime has become even more uncertain.

Presently, then, no other country can look down on China’s growing power. However, the dilemma faced by the Kim Jong Il regime of ensuring its survival by violating the rules and regulations of the international community has started to harm rather than help China. The Chinese government has arrived at the point of needing to set up a new North Korean policy which corresponds better to recent changes to the state of affairs.