What Now for NK Policy?

III.

The drafters of North Korea policy in the South need to look on the postponement of the reunion of divided families as a preview of larger problems to come. That is, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear development.

Not so long ago, North Korea promised to the world that they would not return to the six-party talks. Yet they are now causing a commotion by proposing a return to the same 6-party talks without any preconditions whatsoever. Anyone in their right mind should not place any weight on North Korea’s promises and subsequent reversals.

North Korea’s “negotiation offensive” is an attempt for the regime to buy time for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. Furthermore, during this current lull in hostilities, Pyongyang likely hopes to extract as much economic support as possible from the South.

Throughout this column it has been repeatedly emphasized that North Korea will only participate in the Korean Peninsula Trust Process for a fixed period of time. Once they achieve their goal of miniaturizing nuclear warheads, and the Park Geun Hye government reaches a point where it is unable to change the course of its North Korea policy, they will again start provocations. The postponement of the separated family reunions is simply a preview of this inevitability.

For this reason it is unacceptable for the drafters of North Korea policy to merely sing the praises of Park Geun Hye’s Korean Peninsula Trust Process. Just like President Park’s social welfare policy without increased taxation, the Korean Peninsula Trust Process without additional modifications is bound to fail when faced with objective realities.

Naturally, this is one of the limitations of a five year single-term presidential system. Even so, the drafters of foreign, security and North Korea policy within the current government seem to believe that the president will wave some kind of magic wand and succeed in doing away with the North Korean nuclear program via the current approach.

In her handling of the suspension of operations at the Kaeseong Industrial Complex, President Park maintained the dignity of the South Korean people by acting decisively and with dignity, and by taking the appropriate measures at the right time. This was something that no government from the Kim Dae Jung-Roh Moo Hyun era through the Lee Myung Bak administration had been able to accomplish.

However, the agreement to reopen the complex was achieved less on the basis of President Park’s policies than as a result of the mutual, material interests of both parties. If the underlying policies of the North and South had come into conflict, no solution would have been possible. Indeed, a restart of Mt. Geumgang tourism under the Lee Myung Bak administration was unattainable as fundamental principles could not be abandoned.

President Park Geun Hye’s North Korea policy has now become a “blue ocean”; the administration is blind to the difficulties surrounding the Korean Peninsula Trust Process and nuclear disarmament of North Korea.

The majority of South Koreans believe that President Park can easily solve the North Korean issue. Time, however, is not on her side. To avoid breaking the trust of the South Korean people, the drafters of North Korea policy should depend less on subjective hopes and more on an objective view of the hard facts. A realistic foundation on which to base the Korean Peninsula Trust Process must be found.

Indeed, such a foundation may outwardly appear to be unrelated to “trust-building” at all. Instead of waiting, President Park must act immediately.