Interest in the future direction of China’s North Korea policy is high nowadays, as Vice-premier Xi Jinping and the 5th generation leadership prepares to take the reins of power at the 18th National Congress of China's ruling Communist Party of China, which begins on November 8th.

However, there is a general consensus emerging that says China’s policy towards North Korea will not change dramatically in the first year or two of the Xi era, if it changes at all. Quite the opposite; most believe that the new Chinese administration is going to expand and strengthen relations with Pyongyang.

The 4th generation leadership of Hu Jintao prioritized managing the conduct of a relatively stable North Korea and pushing it gently toward economic development. It promoted denuclearization as a general goal, sided with the international community when it came to pressuring North Korea against conducting missile launches and nuclear tests (though not too much) and played the role of Six-Party Talks mediator between both the two Koreas and the U.S. and North Korea.

China was not acting altruistically; the Hu Jintao government was using its relationship with North Korea as leverage in Northeast Asia, to present itself as a key player at a time when South Korea, the U.S. and Japan were building up their own alliance in order to counter perceived Chinese strength.

Looking back, one North Korea expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Daily NK, “No matter what Xi Jinping’s personal tendencies may be, the last five or six years of China’s policy towards North Korea suggest that change is unlikely.” Senior Researcher Lee Tae Hwan of the Sejong Institute agreed, adding, “As long as North Korea doesn’t undergo sudden internal change or embark on some form of completely catastrophic behavior, it is hard to imagine there will be any change.”

As time passes, China is only likely to become more comfortable intervening in Asian regional circumstances with policies that help to keep the peace. In terms of Northeast Asia and North Korea, this means that China will try to keep North Korea stable, promote modest economic development and simultaneously solidify its position as a member of the G2. Lee explained, “They don’t want to be solving problems when they occur, they want to promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia by getting out ahead of the situation at every turn.”

Choi Chun Heum, a senior researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), agreed, adding that, “China’s national interest is at the core here, and it means enhancing economic support for North Korea so that North Korea remains subject to their control.” Choi also predicted, “The Xi Jinping government will follow a tougher line than the Hu Jintao government did.”

Choi went on, “China will run a policy that secures its economic interests; China has no desire to solve the North Korean nuclear issue; it deems its close relationship with Kim Jong Eun to be more important than that.”

In a recent conference on Chinese policy matters, Professor Zhu Feng of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University mirrored these expert sentiments, pointing to what he sees as the three key elements of China’s North Korea policy.

The first, he said, is China’s promotion of reform and opening in North Korea; second is facilitating denuclearization discussions between the two Koreas and the U.S. and North Korea; and the last is keeping close watch on trends in policy cooperation within the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance.