Facebook
Twitter
Meetup
Advertisements, links with an http address and inappropriate language will be deleted.
2017.08.04
| Won | Pyongyang | Sinuiju | Hyesan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exchange Rate | 8,130 | 8,110 | 8,125 |
| Rice Price | 5,770 | 5,740 | 5,800 |
As part of its reaction to the sinking of the Cheonan back in March, South Korea vowed to resume psychological warfare targeting North Korean military personnel and civilians living and working on and around the DMZ.
However, while government-run radio broadcaster Voice of Freedom has resumed its work, and moreover the psychological warfare infrastructure along the Military Demarcation Line has been re-installed, the loudspeakers have yet to be turned on.
The obvious question is, why?
Controversy over this apparent reluctance to escalate the war of words with North Korea has grown among military experts since the South Korean government also failed to respond to North Korea’s firing of its coastal batteries across the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea last week. Judging by the Ministry of National Defense’s lukewarm attitude, it seems there is now little residual will to resume psychological warfare at this time.
This represents just the latest change to the military authorities’ stance, from the strong ▲ immediate resumption of psychological warfare (May 24th, 2010); to the weaker ▲ resumption after consultation with UN Security Council (June 15th); to the weak ▲ retention as future possible response to additional provocation (July 16th); to ▲ under review, however, no unusual movement from North Korea sighted (August 11th).
In other words, psychological warfare will only be resumed if North Korea undertakes additional provocations, thus finally and completely detaching it from the package of measures which followed the Cheonan incident.
The main reasons which are put forward by experts on the topic are that South Korea is seeking to control the pace due to North Korean resistance, is concerned that the Kaesong Industrial Complex could become hostage to the war of words, and/or is working with one eye on the G-20 meeting in November.
Above all, it is assumed that the military has delayed the resumption due to the strong resistance of North Korea. After North Korea mentioned shooting at and destroying the loudspeakers should they be used, the South Korean military moved to the position of determining any resumption "after the UN Security Council discussions."
In its defense, the military has suggested, "North Korea’s showing an extremely strong response itself suggests that we are being successful in the psychological warfare." Therefore, the positive analysis suggests, the military is comfortable with the situation and is controlling the pace.
However, the worry that the resumption of psychological warfare against North Korea might lead to the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex appears to be playing a role in the calculations.
A North Korean representative warned right after the May 24th measures were announced that if South Korea were to resume psychological warfare broadcasting, "A complete blockage measure will be taken against South Korean personnel and vehicles within the inter-Korean management sector of the West Sea District."
At the time, a diplomatic source pointed out, "The resumption of psychological warfare against North Korea is closely related to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. If North Korea issues a provocation across the MDL due to the resumption of psychological warfare, there could be a serious threat to the personal safety of workers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex."
Experts also say that the South Korean government did not resume the psychological warfare so as to maintain the cooperation of the international community and to avoid building unnecessary tension once the Cheonan incident had been submitted to the UN Security Council.
However, the South Korean government did not resume the psychological warfare against North Korea even after the Presidential Statement was adopted by the UN Security Council. Indeed, the Ministry of National Defense changed its words, from, in the words of Minister of National Defense Kim Tae Young, "The resumption period will be decided with the circumstances in the UN Security Council in mind”, to the idea that psychological warfare would be used as a means of sanctioning North Korean if it were to produce an additional provocation.
Ryu Je Seung, a Senior Policy Planning official at the Ministry of National Defense, stated at a presentation of the Cheonan incident investigation results targeting on August 16th that, "Loudspeakers have been installed at eleven locations and they will be used as a means of additional sanction in case of additional North Korean provocation."
However, the South Korean military also did not resume the psychological warfare when North Korea fired 117 shots from its coastal artillery on August 9th. The military authorities stated at the time that there had been no unusual movement in the Korean People’s Army while commenting, "We are reviewing the resumption of psychological warfare."
Of course, there is also the problem of the Daeseung, a fishing vessel currently in North Korean custody. Resuming psychological warfare would doubtless have a negative effect on the chances of getting the crew back in a timely manner.
Finally, some experts point out that resuming the psychological warfare before the G-20 meeting in November will in itself be difficult. The South Korean government doubtless feels it should manage the Korean Peninsula stably prior to the event, which means that they want to delay resuming psychological warfare since it could incite a North Korean provocation.
On this, a diplomatic source commented, "The most important point is to hold to the principle that psychological warfare will be resumed if North Korea provokes us again, but from the South Korean government’s position, they need to host the G-20 meeting successfully, and therefore, the resumption of psychological warfare will only be possible after the meeting."
Ultimately, experts say that since the window of opportunity for the resumption of psychological warfare has been missed, it is important to firmly lay down the principles for its resumption in future. Especially, they point out that a firm reaction might work to prevent additional provocations.
Kim Yeon Su, a professor at South Korea’s National Defense University said, "Since North Korea can use the G-20 as an opportunity to obtain concessions from South Korea through threats, we need the firm principle that we will resume the psychological warfare without consideration if North Korea creates any future provocations."
Oh Gyeung Seob, a researcher with the Sejong Institute, added, "Psychological warfare against North Korea would have been justified and effective when conducted right after the Cheonan incident. Currently, North Korea is understood to be feeling a considerable amount of pressure about the resumption of psychological warfare, so, therefore, if they make an additional provocation, we need to resume the process."
However, while government-run radio broadcaster Voice of Freedom has resumed its work, and moreover the psychological warfare infrastructure along the Military Demarcation Line has been re-installed, the loudspeakers have yet to be turned on.
The obvious question is, why?
Controversy over this apparent reluctance to escalate the war of words with North Korea has grown among military experts since the South Korean government also failed to respond to North Korea’s firing of its coastal batteries across the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea last week. Judging by the Ministry of National Defense’s lukewarm attitude, it seems there is now little residual will to resume psychological warfare at this time.
This represents just the latest change to the military authorities’ stance, from the strong ▲ immediate resumption of psychological warfare (May 24th, 2010); to the weaker ▲ resumption after consultation with UN Security Council (June 15th); to the weak ▲ retention as future possible response to additional provocation (July 16th); to ▲ under review, however, no unusual movement from North Korea sighted (August 11th).
In other words, psychological warfare will only be resumed if North Korea undertakes additional provocations, thus finally and completely detaching it from the package of measures which followed the Cheonan incident.
The main reasons which are put forward by experts on the topic are that South Korea is seeking to control the pace due to North Korean resistance, is concerned that the Kaesong Industrial Complex could become hostage to the war of words, and/or is working with one eye on the G-20 meeting in November.
Above all, it is assumed that the military has delayed the resumption due to the strong resistance of North Korea. After North Korea mentioned shooting at and destroying the loudspeakers should they be used, the South Korean military moved to the position of determining any resumption "after the UN Security Council discussions."
In its defense, the military has suggested, "North Korea’s showing an extremely strong response itself suggests that we are being successful in the psychological warfare." Therefore, the positive analysis suggests, the military is comfortable with the situation and is controlling the pace.
However, the worry that the resumption of psychological warfare against North Korea might lead to the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex appears to be playing a role in the calculations.
A North Korean representative warned right after the May 24th measures were announced that if South Korea were to resume psychological warfare broadcasting, "A complete blockage measure will be taken against South Korean personnel and vehicles within the inter-Korean management sector of the West Sea District."
At the time, a diplomatic source pointed out, "The resumption of psychological warfare against North Korea is closely related to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. If North Korea issues a provocation across the MDL due to the resumption of psychological warfare, there could be a serious threat to the personal safety of workers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex."
Experts also say that the South Korean government did not resume the psychological warfare so as to maintain the cooperation of the international community and to avoid building unnecessary tension once the Cheonan incident had been submitted to the UN Security Council.
However, the South Korean government did not resume the psychological warfare against North Korea even after the Presidential Statement was adopted by the UN Security Council. Indeed, the Ministry of National Defense changed its words, from, in the words of Minister of National Defense Kim Tae Young, "The resumption period will be decided with the circumstances in the UN Security Council in mind”, to the idea that psychological warfare would be used as a means of sanctioning North Korean if it were to produce an additional provocation.
Ryu Je Seung, a Senior Policy Planning official at the Ministry of National Defense, stated at a presentation of the Cheonan incident investigation results targeting on August 16th that, "Loudspeakers have been installed at eleven locations and they will be used as a means of additional sanction in case of additional North Korean provocation."
However, the South Korean military also did not resume the psychological warfare when North Korea fired 117 shots from its coastal artillery on August 9th. The military authorities stated at the time that there had been no unusual movement in the Korean People’s Army while commenting, "We are reviewing the resumption of psychological warfare."
Of course, there is also the problem of the Daeseung, a fishing vessel currently in North Korean custody. Resuming psychological warfare would doubtless have a negative effect on the chances of getting the crew back in a timely manner.
Finally, some experts point out that resuming the psychological warfare before the G-20 meeting in November will in itself be difficult. The South Korean government doubtless feels it should manage the Korean Peninsula stably prior to the event, which means that they want to delay resuming psychological warfare since it could incite a North Korean provocation.
On this, a diplomatic source commented, "The most important point is to hold to the principle that psychological warfare will be resumed if North Korea provokes us again, but from the South Korean government’s position, they need to host the G-20 meeting successfully, and therefore, the resumption of psychological warfare will only be possible after the meeting."
Ultimately, experts say that since the window of opportunity for the resumption of psychological warfare has been missed, it is important to firmly lay down the principles for its resumption in future. Especially, they point out that a firm reaction might work to prevent additional provocations.
Kim Yeon Su, a professor at South Korea’s National Defense University said, "Since North Korea can use the G-20 as an opportunity to obtain concessions from South Korea through threats, we need the firm principle that we will resume the psychological warfare without consideration if North Korea creates any future provocations."
Oh Gyeung Seob, a researcher with the Sejong Institute, added, "Psychological warfare against North Korea would have been justified and effective when conducted right after the Cheonan incident. Currently, North Korea is understood to be feeling a considerable amount of pressure about the resumption of psychological warfare, so, therefore, if they make an additional provocation, we need to resume the process."
