While North Korea’s fulfillment of the initial phase of the “February 13th Agreement” continues to be delayed, the U.S. and Japan are raising voices that supplemental sanctions is necessary if North Korea fails to act.
Condoleeza Rice, the Secretary of State of the United States, disclosed after the conference with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso on the 1st, “We are awaiting North Korea’s immediate fulfillment of the February 13th agreement. Our patience is not infinite.”
The Secretary of State Rice’s statement is a similar one to the one she revealed after U.S. President George Bush’s top summit with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on the 27th: “The patience of the six party talk nations is not infinite.” As a competent minister of North Korean policy, she strongly urged North Korea’s action for the second time.
Foreign Minister Aso also pressed, “In case North Korea does not show any response within the next several days, initial steps have to be taken.” The Japanese media relayed that Secretary of State Rice also expressed the opinion of taking a hard-line countermeasure, if necessary, in order to pressure fulfillment of the agreement by North Korea.
Regarding this, there has been indication that the Bush administration, who has taken an optimistic view of the fulfillment of the initial stages of the February 13th agreement, may be using this as a countenance for avoiding the hard-line party’s attack first on the appeasement policy towards North Korea.
Even though they are saying “our patience has a limit,” the fact that they are not proposing a timetable for fulfillment of promises has birthed such apprehensions.
However, there are indications that the statement will not be used as a countenance or as a bluff. It means that one cannot just wait for a signal from Pyongyang while North Korea indefinitely delays the agreement’s fulfillment.
The Bush administration, after the midterm elections last November, weakened the power of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other neo-conservatives who had assumed leadership of a hard-line policy towards North Korea. The administration caused a huge change in the North Korea policy by putting forward Secretary of State Rice, who has advised two-party talks with North Korea, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill on the front line.
So, the six-party talks have opened and until the conclusion of the February 13th agreement, it was predicted that there would be a thoroughly consistent order of “action by action.” Until the start of the working group meeting in New York for the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations, according to the February 13th agreement, a premature forecast regarding U.S.-North Korea’s amity was presented.
However, even though the initial stage deadline has completely passed, an “all stop” has been put out due to the transfer issue of 250,000,000 dollars in North Korean BDA funds. Finding common grounds between U.S.’s position that “it has carried out all it can” in relation to the BDA issue and North Korea’s position of demanding “international currency transactions” like before the freeze is not an easy one.
In the midst of this situation, Korea University’s North Korean Studies Professor Yu Ho Yul expressed in a phone conversation with Daily NK on the 2nd, “The possibility of North Korea satisfying the initial stages of the February 13th agreement is high” and “despite this, there is the possibility of additional sanctions if North Korea delays the fulfillment of a detailed agreement. However, the timeline of imposing additional sanctions is not clear.”
Professor Yu said, “The U.S. can carry out detailed UN sanctions and can come up with new ways such as currency sanctions or economic sanctions. If North Korea makes additional requests related to the BDA problem, then the U.S. will pull out its ‘pressure card.’”
Chun Sung Hoon, the Senior Researcher at the Reunification Research Institute said, “Within the U.S., a split opinion coexists regarding the possibility of the Bush administration turning to a hard-line North Korea policy in the case that North Korea does not carry out the February 13th agreement.”
He explained, “If the North Korea nuclear issue becomes worse, there is an assertion that China and South Korea will come forward to resolve the problem through cooperation. There is also the view that on one hand, the change in Bush administration’s North Korea policy is merely a tactical transformation. The strategic purpose remains the same, so it can command a hard-line policy again.”
