[imText1]While the U.S. and North Korea begin their 2nd round of financial talks in Beijing (30th) over the issue of releasing part of North Korea’s frozen accounts in Banco Delta Asia Bank, many question whether or not the U.S. will actually carry out its rescission measures.
The second round of financial talks follows a one month break between the first negotiations that opened in Beijing. Debate on this round of talks has been rather skirmish as it is expected to have a forecast on the result of the 6 party talks on the 8th next month.
Regarding the 2nd round of financial talks, U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt said on the 27th that the talks would be conducted in a business like manner and that he believed that progress would be made on technical issues between the two parties. Deputy Secretary Kimmitt highlighted that the U.S. no longer believed North Korea would participate in further illegal acts but learn from its past mistakes and, that the only clear way to resolve the situation was to push forward.
It appears that the U.S. will inform Macau authorities and state its position once the investigations on North Korea and BDA have been finalized. As the U.S. completes its investigation on BDA, there is even a chance that North Korea’s $24mn fixed in the Macau bank will be partly released.
Further, a report has also been made that the two parties had already agreed on the release of $13mn that was not associated to 50 or so joint British-North Korean accounts being interrogated for money-laundering, on condition the nukes were frozen.
On the other hand, the U.S. Department of Treasury in charge on practical affairs of the BDA issue seems to be taking a different stance on the 6 party talks. Minister Levey of the Department of Treasury said that the financial investigations were very complicated and that it was difficult to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate funds. He said that the fundamental issue was North Korea’s participation on the illegal act though he explicated that the illegal acts was not the subject of discussion. Simply put, North Korea’s manufacture of counterfeit money is not on the agenda of talks.
Despite the Department of Treasury’s position, it is possible that the situation may change and these fundamentals forfeited in order to produce a result with the North’s nukes issue especially with the Bush Administration oblivious of how to take the first step on the Iraq issue.
In relation, now with U.S. Ambassador to the U.N John Bolton out of office, a politician who was renown and criticized on the international arena for his hard-line policy and the resignation of Robert G. Joseph, the State Department’s senior arms control and security official on the 24th, there is raising speculation that changes would be made to the U.S.’ North Korea policy.
Throughout the past, senior official Joseph has argued that a settlement similar to the Geneva talks where at an intermediary stage the nukes are frozen should not be engaged and rather has asserted that a more definite policy where the nukes are abolished entirely should be taken. It is anticipated that senior official Joseph’s resignation will broaden the scope of Assistant-Secretary Hill’s position who is known to be deliberating on abolishing the financial sanctions in replace of negotiations.
If these financial talks recognize the direct illegal acts by North Korea such as producing counterfeit money and disengages this to authorities and if the U.S. considers saving North Korea’s prestige by doing so, it is possible that progress will be made on the BDA issue.
However, even if the second round of financial talks does make progress and the 6 party talks reconvene next month, there are still many obstacles that need to be made before the North’s nuke issue makes any real progress. First, the U.S. requests that the nuclear facilities be frozen, while in fact it premises that the nukes will be dismantled altogether. On the other hand, it seems that North Korea is accepting U.S. requests literally and is expected to act in this literal sense.
The U.S. with a “give a lot, take a lot” approach will try to minimize the time it will take for the final abolition of North Korea’s nukes. Conversely, it is likely that North Korea will try gain time and agree to only freezing the nukes and request that energy be generously supplied in compensation.
If during the negotiations North Korea tries to acquire greater reimbursements while gaining more time and the U.S. is dragged around the tables, this feud which has prolonged for the past 10 years would continue. Then the chances of a resolution during the Bush Administration’s term in office will also pass by.
In the end, the U.S. must make all efforts to bargain with North Korea, as in this case it will easier to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue once the hard-line policy is implemented.
