[imText1]China is in a predicament. While American pressure is getting more intense, Kim Jong Il is still defiant. Even though President Hu’s special envoy, Tang Jiaxuan, visited Pyongyang and consulted with Kim, Washington seemed not inspired by the meeting.
Started as a mediator, China is now expected by everyone to be a trouble-solver.
So is China on the horns of a dilemma. However, Beijing’s scope of choice is limited: there are only three options left for Chinese policymakers.
Firstly, there is Sunshine Policy: continue to feed Kim and try to tame the dictator. As proved in South Korea’s experience, however, the policy requires earnest cooperation from Kim Jong Il. If Kim Jong Il willingly gives up additional nuke tests, participates in the six-party talks and accepts international nuclear inspectors into his territory, China would be more than happy to give whatever Kim wants to receive.
China has given up any hope on Kim Jong IL
Unfortunately for North Korea, China has long given up any hope on its troublesome ally. Political relationship between leaders in Beijing and Kim Jong Il has only been aggravated since China’s reformation started from 1978. Chinese leadership persuaded Kim to imitate Shanghai, Shenzhen and other coastal economic free zones. North Korea only superficially followed the advice by opening a port in Rajin-Sunbong, which soon failed to operate.
Exasperation in Sino-North Korean political relationship influenced the economic cooperation, and border trade between the two countries had virtually stopped for a decade from the eighties to the mid-nineties. It was only after the Great Famine when the border trade resumed.
In reality, since Kim Jong Il’s succession, North Korea has hardly consulted with China on policy matters. Even if it does so, it never listens to the Chinese counterpart. Neither withdrawal from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nor launch of missiles, nor nuclear test was conferred in advance with Beijing; Kim only informed China afterward.
Establishment of Sinuiju Special Administrative Region in 2002 is a symbolic event amid deteriorating Sino-North Korean relationship. Prime Minster of China at that time, Ju Longji, opposed Kim Jong Il’s idea of easy money-making by building casinos in Sinuiju and attracting Chinese millionaires. Moreover, Kim appointed Yang Bin, whom the Chinese government despised, as a head of the new SAR. Yang was eventually arrested by Chinese authorities for tax evasion shortly after his appointment, and the ambitious blueprint of building casino zone went nowhere.
And among the party elites in North Korea, Kim Jong Il incessantly stimulates anti-Chinese attitude. Japanese Kyodo News Agency reported that once in a ambassadors-abroad meeting, Kim Jong Il described China as an ‘unreliable state.’
Therefore, inside Chinese government, there is not much hope left on Kim Jong Il. So it is extremely improbable that China would give him another chance.
China scarcely has any influence over Kim
Second choice is a regime change attempt through total economic blockade.
China can exercise the most influence on North Korean regime in the region; it is the largest trading partner of North Korea, and has continued military alliance since the Korean War. Thus, many people expect China can change the future of North Korea. The U.S. puts pressure on China based on the belief that China is powerful enough to destroy Kim Jong Il, and some South Koreans eve fear Chinese colonization of North Korea.
Indeed, Chinese influence over North Korean economy is huge; if Beijing cuts its economic ties with Pyongyang, NK economy would virtually cease to exist.
What more significant, however, is whether Chinese supremacy can play a role in political relationship. Mere economic collapse can never change the regime; if it could do so, Kim Jung Il should have well been ousted in the late 90s. To influence North Korea’s political structure, China must have its sympathizers positioned among the most powerful elites in Pyongyang. Then, is China capable of correcting NK’s political misbehavior through affecting Kim personally?
The risk of total economic sanction is too high
In terms of political influence over NK, China scarcely has any.
In the past, North Korea sent a huge number of students to study in China. Also, diplomatic and military cooperation was extensive. The sheer history of Sino-North Korean Friendship suggests widespread individual ties between Beijing and Pyongyang.
Surprisingly, however, the Chinese have failed to develop any considerable level of personal links with North Korean elites. It is due to North Korean authorities’ tight control over the NK students, diplomats and army officers in China. It is almost impossible for the North Koreans in China to have private gathering with the Chinese. In any case, a single North Korean person cannot meet Chinese people; there must be at least two. Even if a North Korean befriends a Chinese, the relationship cannot continue after the former goes back to NK because of poor communication; every letter and phone call from abroad is checked by North Korean security agencies.
So, in sum, China does not enjoy much influence over the North Korean elites. Belief in North Korea in the grip of Chinese power is nothing more than illusion. Beijing neither wants nuclear North Korea nor can prevent it. So far is China’s dilemma.
As summarized above, Chinese total economic sanction against North Korea would not lead to an intended result; rather, massive defection of North Korean people after the country’s collapse in economy, while Kim remains in power, is a nightmare of those in Beijing. Simply, the risk of total economic sanction is too high. Therefore, China would choose a gradual contraction of economic cooperation with NK instead of full blockade.
Interest in “post Kim North Korea”
Nor military method to remove Kim Jong Il and to denuclearize NK is feasible. The armed option costs too much and contradicts the Chinese commitment to non-intervention policy. Unless North Korea threatens China’s national security, directly, the government in Beijing will abstain from deployment of military forces in NK.
The third option is a protracted war toward regime-change; first prevention of further nuclear armament by NK, then fostering of post-Kim Jong Il alternative in Pyongyang. Some anticipate China would try to change the regime in Pyongyang before 2008 Beijing Olympics. Kim, however, is shrewd enough to keep pro-Chinese faction among his entourage in check successfully, as he has done so for more than two decades.
Yet, such new objective by Chinese policymakers, aimed at regime change in Pyongyang, can create several significant outcomes in East Asia’s geopolitical circumstances.
Firstly, China is expected to be more gracious to the North Korean refugees, who are potential anti-Kim Jong Il forces in the future. The Chinese government might gather sensitive intelligence from the high-ranking defectors and encourage them to stay in contact with anti-Kim individuals in North Korea.
Secondly, Beijing would establish preliminary relationship with NK human rights organizations and private radio broadcasters airing to North Korea. It is extremely hard to develop an alternative political group in NK, so those outside organizations with even a small connection within the hermit country could be valuable.
Last but not least, China’s expression of interest in ‘post Kim North Korea’ would inspire the South Korean and Japanese governments to consider alternatives to Kim Jong Il, too.
After the nuclear test, it seems the neighbors of NK agreeing on hopelessness of Kim’s voluntary give up of his nuclear warheads. Nor outright military invasion and regime change is far from realistic, unless Kim Jong Il exports his nuclear technology or weapons to international terrorist organizations. The only solution at this moment, then, is indigenous regime change in North Korea, whether from a coup or a popular uprising. This is the reason not only China but also South Korea and Japan must be interested in fostering an alternative to Kim Jong Il.
