[imText1]As the UN Security Council passed a resolution of economic-diplomatic sanctions to punish North Korea, scholars speculate upon Kim Jong Il’s survival strategy.
If the member states sincerely follow the resolution, North Korea’s economy would face the worst-case scenario, but it is uncertain whether Kim himself is bothered at all. And North Korea’s national policy is entirely up to Kim Jong Il’s private interest.
North Korean specialists expect sanctions, including inspections of cargo ships heading to NK, limitation of Beijing and Seoul’s aid to Pyongyang, ban on trade of arms and other goods, will have a huge influence on North Korean economy. Some scholars anticipate that the North’s factory operation rate would fall as low as 10 percent, compared to current rate of 20 to 30 percent, and only agriculture would survive in the country.
Nevertheless, such sanctions will hardly change Kim Jong Il’s behavior. In other words, sanctions against the North Korean economy is not necessarily sanction against Kim himself.
So far, Kim Jong Il has shown little interest in people’s lives. His judgment is so poor that he even ordered to build goat farms around the country to produce meat during the worst period of famine in the mid 90s. And it is probable that Kim would emphasize the regime crisis more than the economic one. Most of all, his journey toward nuclear development while ignoring international isolation proves Kim’s lack of interest in national economy.
Even the UN prohibition of exporting luxury goods to North Korea, as a part of the resolution’s decision, does not seem to effectively pressure Kim Jong Il. Kim’s beloved luxury cars, wine, watches and food ingredients could be smuggled from China. It might hurt Kim’s taste a little, but not as much as to change the dictator’s bad behavior.
Kim Jong Il’s nuclear strategy is simple, simpler than popular conception; being a nuclear state to get rid of domestic insecurity and to intimidate the international society to receive more aid. Probably, Pakistan and India’s successful stories of being accepted into the extremely exclusive nuclear state club are in Kim’s mind.
Therefore, Kim Jong Il will expand its nuclear arsenal and develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons technology despite international pressure. And he might act provocatively to solidify his position of nuclear state and send a message to the international society. Kim is expected to utilize his relatively cordial relationship with South Korea, China, and Russia.
The most eminent threat now is the second nuclear test with warheads of tens of kilotons large, which would aim to the controversy over the first trial. India and Pakistan also tested their nuclear weapons, ranging from one kiloton to several tens of kilotons, more than five times each at their first set of the test in 1998. Both obtained the nuclear state status eventually after the tests.
As of now, it is difficult to resume the six-party talks or bilateral talk between the U.S. and North Korea. It is impossible to negotiate as if nothing happened. Moreover, North Korea would never give up its nukes without compensation.
Pyongyang seems to not consider improvement of the relationship with Washington in the near future. Rather, it would keep its propaganda defending nuclear weapons development as self-defense against the American threat.
Interestingly, it has become more likely that Kim Jong Il is looking for an escape route through Russia, not China. And, by doing so, Kim might try to restrain Chinese sanction.
Kim Jong Il informed Beijing about his nuclear test twenty minutes prior to the experiment, while notifying Moscow two hours earlier. Russia, although the international society was hesitant to confirm the test, recognized the North’s nuclear test. The chief envoy of Moscow to the six-party talks delivered North Korean officials’ supportive remarks on ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ as if they represent the Pyongyang government, after visiting NK on October 13. Thus, South Korea started to contact the Russians more to consult the North Korean issue.
From now on, Kim Jong Il endeavors to break through the isolation in the international community, including China, via improved relations with Moscow. Russia, also, wants to use North Korea as leverage to influence Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The current situation is evidence of Pyongyang’s distrust of Beijing’s cooperation with the U.S.
Kim Jong Il is not a great strategist, not even close. And he cares neither for the international opinion nor for his own people’s lives. Kim’s only point of interest is his regime’s existence, and thus he developed nukes. If nuclear warheads are given up, North Korea would receive economic compensation. But, at the same time, external pressure to reform the society and improve human rights conditions, and inflow of information into the people would be unbearable.
In sum, Kim Jong Il’s survival strategy is to be acknowledged as a nuclear state. But it is not possible that the UN would bestow a ‘nuke club membership’ upon Kim Jong Il, who is more dangerous to export the nuclear technology to terrorists than any other countries. Unreliable Kim and the international society’s interests are completely incompatible. Ultimately, Kim’s nuclear warheads would destroy the owner himself.
