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2017.06.28
| Won | Pyongyang | Sinuiju | Hyesan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exchange Rate | 8,070 | 8,050 | 8,095 |
| Rice Price | 5,800 | 6,000 | 5,900 |
China is reportedly considering the dispatch of a delegation to Pyongyang to caution the Kim regime against conducting a third nuclear test. However, experts warn that such a diplomatic effort has little chance of affecting North Korean decision-making unless it incorporates an official from the highest echelons of the Chinese leadership.
This position is based on past precedent; if it happens, this will not be the first time that China has sent a delegation to North Korea to try and ameliorate its behavior. In 2006, ten days after the first North Korean nuclear test, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao sent envoy Tang Jiaxuan to persuade Kim Jong Il to return to the Six-Party Talks, but to no avail. Then, in April 2009, North Korea launched a long-range rocket, an act that led China to review the idea of sending a special envoy to Pyongyang once again; however, that plan was canceled a month later when the North carried out its second nuclear test.
Most recently, China sent a delegation to Pyongyang last November to discuss the country’s latest long-range rocket launch plan; however, North Korea disregarded whatever cautionary words were conveyed and launched the rocket anyway.
Therefore, “If North Korea were willing to listen to the words of a Chinese delegation then they would not have revealed their plan to conduct a nuclear test in the first place,” one diplomatic source pointed out. “Neighboring countries want China to lead the way, so they are trying to look as if they are making a diplomatic effort.”
In other words, even if China does opt to send a delegation this time around, it will be unable to seriously influence North Korea’s final decision.
Given this reality, the main reason behind Beijing’s review of the idea is thought to be because it hopes to show the international community that it is a responsible stakeholder with an active interest in regional peace and security. Pessimistic observers describe the move as little more than a foil for an ongoing determination not to enforce existing UN sanctions, possibly due to concerns that doing so might imperil North Korea’s existence.
One observer believes that there is only one way to change both this perception of events and the likelihood of a delegation meeting with success. According to Dr. Choi Chun Heum, a senior researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification, “There will substantial results only if someone in a position of real power like a member of the Politburo Standing Committee is on the visiting delegation. The current effort will certainly not yield any results.”
This position is based on past precedent; if it happens, this will not be the first time that China has sent a delegation to North Korea to try and ameliorate its behavior. In 2006, ten days after the first North Korean nuclear test, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao sent envoy Tang Jiaxuan to persuade Kim Jong Il to return to the Six-Party Talks, but to no avail. Then, in April 2009, North Korea launched a long-range rocket, an act that led China to review the idea of sending a special envoy to Pyongyang once again; however, that plan was canceled a month later when the North carried out its second nuclear test.
Most recently, China sent a delegation to Pyongyang last November to discuss the country’s latest long-range rocket launch plan; however, North Korea disregarded whatever cautionary words were conveyed and launched the rocket anyway.
Therefore, “If North Korea were willing to listen to the words of a Chinese delegation then they would not have revealed their plan to conduct a nuclear test in the first place,” one diplomatic source pointed out. “Neighboring countries want China to lead the way, so they are trying to look as if they are making a diplomatic effort.”
In other words, even if China does opt to send a delegation this time around, it will be unable to seriously influence North Korea’s final decision.
Given this reality, the main reason behind Beijing’s review of the idea is thought to be because it hopes to show the international community that it is a responsible stakeholder with an active interest in regional peace and security. Pessimistic observers describe the move as little more than a foil for an ongoing determination not to enforce existing UN sanctions, possibly due to concerns that doing so might imperil North Korea’s existence.
One observer believes that there is only one way to change both this perception of events and the likelihood of a delegation meeting with success. According to Dr. Choi Chun Heum, a senior researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification, “There will substantial results only if someone in a position of real power like a member of the Politburo Standing Committee is on the visiting delegation. The current effort will certainly not yield any results.”
