There is confusion within the South Korean government over the cause of the sudden discharge from the Hwangkang Dam on September 6th, and what it means.
A portion of the media has cited the words of both a high-level government official and U.S. and South Korean intelligence sources which recently claimed that, after analyzing before and after satellite photos of the Hwangkang Dam, the water was up to the high-water mark at the time of the discharge.
However, authorities related to the Blue House, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Unification unanimously refuted the claim the following day.
A high-level Blue House official said, “Photos taken of the dam on the day of the flooding are not very clear, so it is difficult to make an accurate assessment. It is safer to say that the water level was neither high nor empty, but somewhere in between.”
Won Tae Jae, a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, commented, “The dam contains a hydro-electric generator so it always contains a certain level of water, but it is a stretch to say that it was at the high-water mark. Due to the nature of satellite photos, it is difficult to draw a precise conclusion.”
The confusion which has emerged from intelligence analysis has produced the resultant misunderstanding that a close examination of the causes of the incident depends on the water level in the Hwangkang Dam right before the discharge.
While North Korea–the perpetrator of the incident–has been exercising the right to silence, South Korea, the victim, has not only endured the North’s strategy, but has also fallen into the trap of claiming that the “Imjin River Incident” resulted from an unavoidable situation.
North Korea has been relatively tight-lipped about the incident, except to briefly give its explanation on the 7th, “The water level in the upper reaches of the Imjin River rose behind the dam, resulting in a rapid discharge of water on the night of the 5th and the early morning of the 6th. In future, if we have to discharge a large volume of water to prevent damage to the Imjin River, we will dispatch a report prior to doing so.”
Of course, there are several logical reasons for the incident. However, as long as the North does not offer a detailed explanation, all conclusions are nothing more than guesses.
What is clear is that if the North had not suddenly discharged the water then the incident on the 6th would not have taken place. Although they say that the flood was not planned and that personnel in charge failed to properly regulate the water level, if it had alerted South Korea beforehand then there would have been no loss of life.
At any rate, the North bears a clear responsibility, regardless of whether the deaths resulted from willful negligence or premeditated murder, so they should seriously consider their responsibility, for it is not too late for South Korea to make a revised assessment after listening to a detailed explanation of what went on.
But the situation must be avoided where the omission of a genuine explanation from the North leads to increased South Korean curiosity and greater support for the unavoidability hypothesis.
It is disappointing to hear dissenting voices from diplomatic and national security authorities, and to see the glossing over of the real essence of the incident at hand. The possibility is that these responses from South Korean authorities are a reflection of a struggle over how to deal with the two-faced strategy recently adopted by the North, and this too is a problem.
Our response to this incident should be quite simple. We must demand that the North take full responsibility for the tragedy which took six South Korean lives and give both an apology and a guarantee against any repeat. Also, North and South must create a joint prevention system. If the North does not accommodate such requests, then existing projects in North Korea, with the exception of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, should not be resumed.
