A description of the last hours of the Cheonan and explanations for events such as the offensive activities of a nearby South Korean patrol vessel at the time of the sinking were offered in a detailed Ministry of National Defense press conference yesterday.
The Ministry first confirmed that the Sokcho, a Navy vessel patrolling nearby at the time of sinking of the Cheonan on March 27th, had indeed fired at an ‘unidentified object’ which it assumed at the time to be a North Korean ship fleeing after attacking the Cheonan.
According to the Ministry, this action reflected a heightened state of alert following the explosion. “The 2nd Fleet Headquarters ocean alert had been increased to Level A,” it revealed, “and, as per that alert level, the Northern Limit Line (NLL) guard was strengthened by the forward deployment of a corvette (the Sokcho), which had been patrolling the waters 49 km from the accident site.”
“The Sokcho detected an unidentified object heading north at 42 knots on its radar north of Baekryeong Island. In that critical situation, the Sokcho assumed that the unidentified object was an enemy war ship fleeing after attacking the Cheonan, and fired on it (11~11:05 P.M.) with the approval of the 2nd Fleet Headquarters and after firing a warning shot.”
According to Ministry analysis, the Sokcho fired its 76mm principal battery at a distance of 9.3 kilometers.
However, “After the Sokcho finished firing, it analyzed the object it had detected on the radar and from the specifics presumed it to be the track of a flock of birds (object separated into two and combined as one repeatedly on the radar; contact and unrecognized noise when passing near (1000 yards) ground radar detection base; final location before disappearance was onshore) and when examined with EOTS (Electric Optics Tracking System), it was a collection of dispersed dots. Also, though moving at high speed, no wake was discerned.”
The Ministry then explained the precise timing of the accident, “Initially, this Ministry announced 9:45 P.M., the time of the report received by cable from Navy Operations Headquarters, as the time of the accident. Later, in a National Assembly report and public announcements, the Ministry corrected the time released by 2nd Fleet Headquarters Navy Operations Headquarters to 9:30 P.M., based on the time the chief gunner on the Cheonan reported to 2nd Fleet Headquarters by cell phone.”
However, the Ministry then added, “After aggregating the captain’s two statements of March 27th (testified accident time as 9:25 p.m.) and 28th (corrected to 9:22 P.M.), the time Captain Kim Kwang Bo, chief gunner on the Cheonan, reported to Major Kim Dong Hyun, the operations room chief, by cell phone (9:28 P.M.), the time a Thermal Observation Device (TOD) recorded from the shore and the testimony of soldiers (9:34 P.M.), and the seismic wave measured by the Korea Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources (9:21:58 P.M.), the time of the accident is now estimated to have been 9:20 P.M.”
In addition, the ministry stated, “A more accurate result will be confirmed by the joint commission investigation which is currently underway.”
Regarding the rumored movements of a North Korean submarine before and after the incident, the Ministry announced, “The Ministry has looked at the movements of that day; no movement by a North Korean submarine was detected. Therefore, the Ministry believes the possibility of their involvement to be very low.”
However, “Nothing, including submarine activity, has been excluded and the investigation will proceed jointly between civilians and the military both scientifically and objectively. The results of the investigation will be reported to the people in detail.”
The Ministry also explained why the Cheonan was patrolling on an unfamiliar route at the time of the tragedy, “At that moment, the Cheonan was on duty within an approved patrol area. The reason why the Cheonan was operating near Baengryeong Island was to take advantage of geography on its patrol mission.”
“This was to provide more flexibility for maneuvering compared to the past. This had been done about ten times since the appointment of the captain.”
The Ministry then described the onboard situation at the time of the sinking. “Prior to the incident, the captain was checking the Korea Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS) after making his rounds. At the moment of the explosion, he lost consciousness for three or four seconds and was trapped in the captain’s cabin for approximately five minutes. Soldiers came and broke down the door to escort him to the bridge deck; the stern of the ship had been cut off and was nowhere to be seen. The bow of the ship was listing heavily to the right; 20 soldiers and officers were assembled on the deck.”
Afterward, the captain ordered the 20 soldiers and officers to search each bay in order to rescue the other 30 survivors, had the chief gunner report the damage to 2nd Fleet Headquarters, and then moved all survivors to the deck at around 9:50 P.M. He made sure that all measures were implemented safely and in an organized way.
At around 10:40 P.M. as rescue vessels arrived on the scene, the captain ordered survivors to be taken off the ship and then left as the last person at around 11:10 P.M. after confirming that no survivors had been left behind. According to the Ministry, most of the officers including the captain agree that the captain did his duty until the end by participating in the rescue mission and being the last to leave the ship.
Moving on to discuss the rescue operation, the Ministry explained, “The 71st SSU (Ship Salvage Unit) was given an emergency summons at 9:55 P.M., 40 minutes after the incident, and made preparations for dispatch within 3 hours. The unit was separated into two buses and transported to Pyeongtaek by land at 1:00 a.m. The next morning, they arrived on Baengnyeong Island at around 10:00 A.M. by helicopter and selected the base for the operation. The rescue operation began at 3:00 P.M.”
Defending the length of time taken by the military to find parts of the stricken vessel, a source of some disquiet, the Ministry pointed out, “Given the frustration of the citizens, this is understandable. However, citizens need to consider that the specific equipment installed on a war ship is based on its needs during operations.”
Especially, “The detection pattern of the sonar installed on a naval corvette is designed to detect a submarine, which means that it has limitations when searching for a target on the ocean floor. Also, since it uses high frequency sound, it can damage the hearing of divers operating within 50 yards.”
The Ministry finally outlined the safety and maintenance record of the vessel. “Regular maintenance was done between August 2nd and October 20th, 2008, field maintenance and crew checks were done twice and once respectively in the last year. Also, a crew check was conducted in February, at which time there was no halt to operations due to equipment failure.”
The Ministry went on, “During the regular maintenance period in 2008, the vessel was dry-docked, and no specific problem was found from wear and deterioration.”
The Ministry therefore believes that fatigue cracks cannot have been to blame for the sinking.
Regarding the survivors and families of the missing, the Ministry explained, “52 rescued soldiers were transported to the Armed Forces Capital Hospital for treatment. The testimonies of survivors will be open to the public as soon as the situation has been made stable.”
In particular, the Ministry was keen to point out, “Presuming the cause of the accident without a proper investigation could create unnecessary misunderstanding and suspicion. Therefore, investigating the cause through detailed research after salvaging the ship is the appropriate course. We will look at all the possibilities and the cause will be determined by thorough investigation.”
