[imText1]The academic world proposed the forecast that if this year’s six party talks develop, the voices of the extreme leftistsin South Korea will rise and North Korea will actively intervene in domestic politics.
On the 16th, Kyunghee University professor Woo Seung Ji forecasted at the academic conference sponsored by Korea International Political Studies Committee, “North Korea, after the June 15th joint declaration, has been weakening the U.S.-Korea alliance under the banner of cooperation of the Korean nation and are seeking a plan to construct the united front with South Korea.”
Professor Woo analyzed, “North Korea’s strategy towards the South is a practical one that expands economic cooperation with South Korea. By enlarging the cooperation of the extreme leftists inside South Korea, it is also focusing on a strategy to isolate the conservative strategy.”
Also, he summarized the key strategies within North Korea’s whole strategy towards the South as: 1) emphasizing the principle of the Korean nation first, 2) abolishing legal and institutional apparatus within South Korea, and 3) strengthening North-South economic cooperation.
He commented, “If North and South jointly run this year’s events such as the June 15th and August 15th events, the interest regarding the issue of the nation will increase and the voice of the extreme leftists in South Korea will have a greater effect. If Pyongyang exhibits a strong nation drive according to the development of the six party talks, the appearance of North-South Korea summit talks or an international summit talk of related surrounding countries is possible.”
He said, “If a North-South summit talk is accomplished, the possibility exists that Kim Jung Il will request the development of discussion on reunification after the June 15th joint declaration with early reunification as the background. As a proposition of the summit, he can demand the abolition of National Security Law and South Korea’s anti-North Korea regime.”
In addition, Professor Woo said, “Around the time of the February 13th joint declaration, the North Korean nuclear issue first entered the negotiation phase. North Korea, through the phase of dialogue, may wage the calculation of trying to gain security of its system.
He upheld, “What North Korea wants the most is becoming the Vietnam or Pakistan of Northeast Asia.”
”If we seek the ‘higher stages of non-nuclear proliferation strategy’ that includes basic nuclear materials and nuclear weapons as well as nuclear programs, we will realize the impossibility of Vietnam and Yongbyun nuclear reactors. In the case of a ‘low-level non-nuclear strategy’ which tries to supplement basic nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, North Korea will become Pakistan.”
Professor Woo predicted, “North Korea most prefers a low non-nuclear standard. There is great possibility that it will aim for a “Big Deal” with America with the cards of “Prevention of Nuclear Flare-up” and “Forfeit of Developing Long-distance Missiles.”
He also gave weight to the possibility of the “realization of North Korea’s strategy, which will be yet another result of Kim Jung Il’s military diplomacy. Also, during the Bush administration’s term of office, the United States can get a temporary stitching of North Korea’s nuclear issue and gain the effects of preventing additional nuclear expansion.”
Dongguk University Professor Ko Yu Hwan maintained, “If North Korea can peacefully resolve the nuclear issue with the U.S., it will end up creating an environment that can consider in earnest reform and opening up measures which put economy first and military politics behind.”
Professor Ko stated, “We are entering an important period. How North Korea solves the nuclear issue will affect the nation’s fate. If the North Korean leadership division does not resolve its nuclear problem early and the structural crisis continues, North Korean citizens will harbor doubts regarding the capability of Kim Jung Il’s regime.”
Further, he said, “During negotiations, North Korea’s drastic position for securing a beneficial resolution can vastly change the current of the North’s nuclear resolution. If North Korea has considered important the circumstances after the nuclear tests, the situation going forward will be whether or not the fulfillment of the “February 13th joint declaration” will take the lead.
