There was speculation within the South
Korean government in 1984 that Kim Il Sung would step down and North Korea was devising concrete plans for who would be at the helm. The South
Korean government considered Kim Il Sung’s visits to
USSR and Eastern Europe in May and June of that year to heavily bear the
characteristics of a “farewell visit.”
According to diplomatic documents released
by South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on
March 30th, 2015, the section chief of the Northeast Asia department with Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the political affairs section chief at South Korea’s Embassy in Japan on June 23rd, 1984, “Kim Il Sung will soon resign from his president position, upon which
Kim Jong Il will succeed him.”
High-ranking officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in both Bulgaria and Romania, two of the countries Kim Il Sung
visited on his tour, made remarks that would serve as the basis for South Korea’s assumptions.
These comments were made to high-ranking officials affiliated with Japanese embassies located in the two European countries. The Bulgarian official stated, “Kim Jong Il will be the top
leader by 1985,” while the Romanian official said that “this visit to the USSR and Eastern Europe reflects the intention of
Kim (Il Sung) to step down soon and bequeath his post to Kim Jong Il.”
In response to reports from the South Korean
Embassy in Japan, the government rushed to begin discussing preparations for the transfer of power. On July 11th,1984, Park Se Jik, the secondary deputy head of Agency for National Security
Planning (ANSP), presided over the working session involving a legion of organizations: Cheong Wa Dae, Prime Minister’s Office, Department of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, National
Unification Ministry, and the organization then titled the Ministry of Culture and Public Information.
The South Korean government drew up approximate plans and statements–covering scenarios involving both the death or survival of Kim Il Sung–for Kim Jong Il’s expected power succession. Included in the policies discussed were intentions to clandestinely carry out activities to raise international
awareness on the illegitimacy of Kim Jong Il’s regime.
It aimed to foster cooperative refusal– from not only Western Europe but also communist societies–to acknowledge Kim Jong Il’s succession of power.
The South Korean military also tried to
predict the specific date in which the newly risen authority, Kim Jong Il,
would carry out military provocations against South Korea. The Defense
Intelligence Agency released a document entitled “The
Evaluation of and Response to the Dangers of Kim Jong Il’s Succession to Power and the Related Provocation Against the South,” which stated that in April of 1988 South Korea would be most vulnerable to attacks from North Korea, namely due to presidential elections in both the United States and South Korea,
the Seoul Olympics, and North Korea’s military training.
Fostering dialogue between the Koreas to propel mid and
long-term bilateral exchanges also enumerated among the policies laid out by the government. The “MOFA Measures” reflected the government’s
intentions to focus on condemning Kim Il Sung during, at least, the first month
after Kim’s resignation; however, all criticism of
the North would be halted within one or two months.
This move would be coupled with postponed discussions regarding North Korea’s bombing of Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Burma in 1983, in which North Korean agents tried to assassinate the then-South Korean president, Chun Doo Hwan.
According to the diplomatic document, this decision was a response to a report, submitted by North Korea to the United Nations Committee on Civil and Political Rights, denouncing South Korea’s violation of human rights
and oppression during the Gwangju Democratic Movement, describing it as “a brutal massacre on our compatriots.”
The South Korean government swiftly
initiated its response, underscoring that North Korea’s remarks on South Korea in the report violated the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights rules, which stipulated that the report should only cover “the state’s general affairs and issues of progress.”
The South Korean UN representative presiding
over the debate on April 9th, 1984 warned North Korea that it “should refrain from making political remarks about another country’s issues on human rights,” and to “prevent recurrence” informed the North that evidence and documentation of these issues must first be presented to the relevant committee.
