Reading Between the Lines of an Anniversary Year

With the exception of a January 15th threat of holy war against South Korea’s Blue house, the New Year has been chock full of apparent appeasement moves by North Korea. Which begs the question – what is North Korea up to?

One of the more intriguing possibilities is that these moves may be a preventative and preemptive measure against South Korea’s anticipated criticism of the Korean War in this, the 60th anniversary year of the still-unresolved conflict. Kim Jong Il may have foreseen the possibility that Seoul will try to marshal public opinion against North Korea’s responsibility for the conflict, and is guarding against this.

Via telephone message on January 14th, North Korea’s Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee – an organization affiliated with the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party – suggested that the two counties hold a working level meeting in order to resume tours in Kaesong and Mt. Geumgang. South Korea is now considering the offer.

At the same time, on the 11th, North Korea implied that it could exclude South Korea from the group of countries,which could meet to discuss a Korean War peace treaty. So in a broader sense, North Korea’s strategy towards both the international community and South Korea has not changed.

When North Korea discusses the nuclear and peace treaty issues with the U.S., the North and South can simultaneously address renewed economic cooperation based on the June 15 and October 4 Joint Declarations, the results of the two Inter-Korea Summits. Simply put, Kim Jong Il’s intention is only to go back the “peaceful era of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun.”

Under those leaders, South Korea was anxious to engage the North into a dialogue of economic cooperation. Thanks to that positive approach, North Korea was able to develop nuclear weapons behind the curtain of the two summits.

However, since the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak, South Korea has stopped begging the North for such dialogue, forcing as it were North Korea into an appeasement corner. Although this is marked shift in tactics by North Korea from its behavior during the last Sunshine Policy period, we should not mistake the appeasement gestures for any sort of fundamental strategic shift.

As always, the motivation for Kim Jong Il is to secure sovereignty while putting his closest adversary at a disadvantage. Ideally for North Korea, the latest process efforts would eventually lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South and a cancellation of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance.

Both South Korea and the international community must see through North Korea’s generally benevolent 2010 stance and stand firm. A resolution of the Korean War must be inseparable from the complete denuclearization of North Korea and a full accounting of the POW and abduction matters. The U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia and China should maintain a tight grip on U.N. Sanctions so that Kim Jong Il has no choice but to step forward onto the international stage.