The words “nuclear development” have not been mentioned in any recent public announcements made by North Korea. At the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) held on April 11 in Pyongyang, Choe Ryong Hae, vice chairman of the Central Party Committee, asserted North Korea’s position as a “global military power”, and “strategic power”. This was in contrast to previous meetings of a similar nature during events last year when North Korea referred to itself as a “nuclear power.”
In the April 11 issue of North Korea’s state-run publication Rodong Sinmun, rather than referencing the regime’s policy for simultaneous nuclear and economic development (known as the Byungjin Line), a new type of strategy was proposed. With no references to nuclear development during the SPA session nor the Rodong Sinmun from the same day, it appears that the North Korean government is deliberately avoiding any mention of the topic altogether.
With Kim Jong Un having expressed a desire for denuclearization towards the Special South Korean delegation that visited North Korea in March, and discussing the possibility of a “phased denuclearization” on his visit to China, it is very likely that the North Korean leader is intentionally avoiding the use of the words “nuclear development” in advance of a scheduled meeting with the United States. With negotiations on the table between the two countries, there is no reason to risk angering the US by mentioning nuclear weapons.
However, the North Korean government has made no mention of denuclearization either. The only mention of an alleged intent to pursue denuclearization has been during meetings with South Korea, the United States, and China. There has yet to be an official statement made to the North Korean people regarding the issue.
In reality, Choe Ryong Hae’s statement about becoming a “strategic power” is all but the same as being a nuclear power in meaning, and the “new approach” mentioned in the state-run newspaper is likely another way of referring to “simultaneous nuclear and economic development.” “Nuclear development” wasn’t directly mentioned in the central party’s plenary meeting (the Supreme People’s Assembly), which has the power to amend the constitution, while wording in the constitution about North Korea being a “nuclear power’ (2012) and related laws such as one requiring North Korean to “remain strong in its conviction of becoming a nuclear power as a justifiable act of self-defense” (2013) remain unchanged. To its domestic audience, North Korea has not shown any signs of intent towards changing their stance on becoming a nuclear power.
For North Korea, who until last year was broadcasting its intent to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles to the world, suddenly mentioning denuclearization to its domestic audience could be burdensome. On February 23, North Korean media published an article stating that, “desiring North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons is more foolish than waiting for the ocean to dry out”.
However, it remains uncertain whether North Korea is shying away from publicly mentioning “denuclearization’ solely on the basis of it being a difficult endeavor. If North Korea uses roundabout politics while emphasizing that “it is the wishes of our ancestors for us to succeed in denuclearization,” it may be able to ensure security for the Kim regime through a groundbreaking compromise with the countries involved.
With a summit with the United States concerning denuclearization fast approaching, the fact that there hasn’t yet been a public statement made within North Korea on the issue could be interpreted as evidence that the Kim regime has yet to make a final decision on the matter. The international community cannot be confident that there will be an acceptable compromise with the United States, nor whether denuclearization will actually happen.
How and when North Korea decides to inform its citizens regarding its alleged plans for denuclearization will be heavily dependent on how the scheduled summit meetings proceed with South Korea and the United States. If the negotiations go favorably for Kim Jong Un, then mention of denuclearization may begin gradually, but if the reverse is true, there may never be any mention of denuclearization. In some ways, talk of the word denuclearization being publicized inside North Korea can be seen as a litmus test to judge what Kim Jong Un thinks about the negotiations that are taking place.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
